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Abstract
After the official end of apartheid in South Africa, land reform was one of the
most highly prioritized items on the new ANC government's agenda, both as a
matter of economic restructuring and redressing past injustices. Although
numerous land reform programs and initiatives have been implemented since
1994, they have largely failed to reach any of the redistribution goals set forth for
them. There is a high rate of failure among land redistribution projects, which are
often managed by up to one hundred people. This complicated group management
situation is necessitated by the combination of the small grant size available to
individual applicants and the high price of agricultural land and implements. In
addition, the grants are often contingent upon the participants’ adherence to a
large-scale, chemically- and mechanically-intensive farm business model with
which they have little, if any, experience. In light of the problems with the current
land reform programs in South Africa, I assess the viability of small-hold farming
as an alternative to the current focus on large-scale commercial farms using a
political ecology framework. As very few small-hold redistribution projects exist,
my project focuses on examining one such project in depth. I examine the
economic and environmental sustainability of the farm, in addition to the level of
satisfaction of the beneficiaries. The assessment of these factors gives an
indication of whether land redistribution programs in South Africa could improve
their success rates by offering the option of small-hold projects to land grant
applicants. It also provides a narrative of the many obstacles encountered in the
beneficiaries’ struggle to make a farm of their own—a narrative that reveals many
shortcomings in the government’s land redistribution policies and support
infrastructure.
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Chapter I
Introduction
After the official end of apartheid in 1994, the new African National
Congress (ANC) leadership was left with the enormous task of transforming the
South African society from one of entrenched structural discrimination to one of
racial integration and equity—a ‘Rainbow Nation’. Among the most highly
prioritized items on the ANC’s agenda for a new South Africa has been land
reform. Despite the fact that it comprised only 13% of the population by 1994, the
white minority controlled roughly 85% of South Africa’s land as a result of
centuries of legally-backed black dispossession (Thompson, 2001). Taking into
account these disproportionate land ownership statistics, South Africa’s land
reform process has been deemed both politically and economically necessary:
politically necessary in order to redress the injustices committed against nonwhites, and economically necessary in order to redistribute South Africa’s wealth
and alleviate widespread poverty (Zimmerman, 2000).
Unfortunately, over a decade after the end of apartheid it is a widely-held
and well-substantiated view that neither the political nor the economic objectives
of land reform are being met (Zimmerman, 2000; Mather, 2002; Moseley, 2007).
In its optimistic nascent years, the ANC promised to redistribute 30% of the entire
nation’s land to “historically disadvantaged individuals” (non-whites) by 1999 as
part of the broader national Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP).
When it became clear in 1999 that the land reform initiatives had fallen pitifully
short of this goal, the target for 30% redistribution was pushed back to 2014
(Cousins, 2006). In 2001, the figure for redistribution of white farms to non-
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whites stood at less than one percent of the country’s total land; as of 2006, all the
land reform programs together (including restitution) had only redistributed four
percent of the land (Mather, 2003; Cousins, 2006).
Of the tiny fraction of farms that have been redistributed, an even smaller
proportion succeeds in providing viable livelihoods for their beneficiaries. The
post-apartheid government’s focus on economic growth for poverty alleviation
has translated into neoliberal reform strategies and a market-led redistribution
program that is increasingly focused on large-scale commercial agriculture—a
system with which most beneficiaries have little, if any, experience (Zimmerman,
2000). Additionally, the limited availability of grant funding often forces
beneficiaries to pool their grants with dozens of other households to purchase a
single farm (Moseley, 2007). Considering these complicated group management
schemes, the lack of supportive infrastructure and participant experience, and the
predictably unmanageable debts of high-input, chemically- and mechanicallyintensive modern farms, it is a wonder any redistribution projects have succeeded
at all.
In light of the current problems associated with the large-scale commercial
redistribution model, the main objective of this research is exploratory in nature—
to investigate the viability of a small-hold farming model in hopes of finding an
alternative mould for South Africa’s land redistribution program. As small-hold
redistribution projects are rare, this research has, at least partially out of necessity,
taken the form of a case study of one such project, a farm called Bokdrif*, in the
Western Cape Province. This exploratory case study has sought to answer three
*

Names have been changed to protect the identity of the farmers and some interviewees.
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main research questions using a political ecology lens. First of all, can small-hold
farms offer a more appropriately contextualized, economically sustainable
business model than large-scale commercial farming? Next, do small-hold farms
present a more environmentally sustainable business model than the current
program? Finally, how does the level of beneficiary satisfaction with the smallhold project compare with those of the conventional models?
In the process of researching these questions, it became clear that my
project was fulfilling a second, descriptive objective that I had not thought to
include in my original research plan: it provides a powerful, concrete narrative of
the

very

real

difficulties

encountered

by

‘historically

disadvantaged

individuals’—a term that has attained connotations that are all too abstract—in
their efforts to take back land that was wrested away from their ancestors. Writing
this project from the point of view of an ‘objective’ academic observer became
impossible, as did my attempt to rid my analysis of the emotional investments of
all those parties involved in attempting to make Bokdrif a successful farm.
Heasely (2005), reflecting on her experience as an African geographer, states “not
only does detachment produce its own biases, in the worst cases it reproduces
incorrect interpretations of relationships between people and their environment.
These interpretations can have extraordinarily negative consequences for African
people” (para. 6). Instead of restricting myself by adhering to the role of detached
researcher, then, I have endeavored to give as full and honest an account of this
project as I possibly can by including myself as a narrator and re-ifying my
presence as the researcher. This is done in the hopes that it will add the insight of
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a different perspective into the body of academic literature on land reform—a
perspective on the ‘sweat, blood and tears’ that have been invested by so many
people into land reform projects in South Africa.
After an overview of the methods used to achieve the above two
objectives, this paper proceeds with a literature review which examines academic
conversations on land redistribution and small-hold farming models around the
world, along with South Africa-specific land redistribution issues. This literature
review is accompanied by a summary of the historical contexts needed for
understanding land redistribution in the post-apartheid era. Next is a descriptive
account of the Bokdrif farmers’ experience in the redistribution program, then a
results section that analyzes the economic and environmental sustainability of the
project, along with the participants’ satisfaction with it, in comparison with
conventional projects. Finally, I conclude with recommendations for policy
makers and suggestions for further research.
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Chapter II
Methodology
My interest in conducting this study on South African land reform
stemmed from an independent research project I conducted as part of my study
abroad program at the University of Cape Town from January to June, 2007. The
program was titled “Globalization and the Natural Environment,” and included a
seminar taught by my academic advisor at Macalester, William Moseley, who has
researched and published articles on South African land reform (see Moseley,
2006a; 2006b; 2007). I benefited greatly from his experience and contacts in this
field, as he introduced me both to Bokdrif as a project and the people who would
become my key informants for this paper.
To frame my primary research and field work, I examined three loosely
defined bodies of literature. These included literature on land reform around the
world, specifically in reference to market-led agrarian reform (MLAR), scholarly
work that examines small-hold farming models in general (especially those which
drew comparisons with large-scale commercial farming models), and finally,
work that highlights South Africa-specific land reform issues. I chose these three
topics because the combination of them allows an examination of two major
themes of my research—land reform and small-hold agriculture—across multiple
scales, which I believe crucial to a full understanding of my particular case study.
It will hopefully prove to make my research conversant with as broad a body of
academic literature as possible for the scope of my project.
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Bokdrif and the Case Study Model
As previously mentioned, small-hold redistribution projects are somewhat
uncommon in South Africa’s Western Cape Province (and in all of South Africa)
primarily because of the government’s focus on large-scale models. To my
knowledge, only one such project existed within the geographical extent of my
possible research area as of the commencement of my investigation, making a
‘deviant case study’ model the most effective and practical option for this
research (Patton, 1990). A deviant case study illuminates the causal processes that
have resulted in an atypical ‘case’ of a larger sample; in this instance, Bokdrif is
an atypical example of the larger sampling of land reform projects in the Western
Cape.
The case study as a research model, deviant or otherwise, has often been
belittled in academia and “stereotyped as a weak sibling among social science
research methods,” labeled as overly subjective, imprecise, and lacking in rigor
(Yin, 2003, pg. xiii). Despite this reputation, case studies can provide useful and
even ideal research models when confronting a “technically distinctive situation
in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points” (Yin,
2003, pg. 13). The focus here, as opposed to other social science investigation
methods, is on examining an entire process (land redistribution) as experienced by
one entity (the beneficiaries), rather than a snapshot of one step of a process for a
large number of actors. As my research aims to contribute to the formation of a
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more effective land redistribution process for historically disadvantaged
individuals, the deviant case study model is clearly appropriate.
Schramm (1971) highlights further that case studies characteristically
“illuminate a decision or set of decisions; why they were taken, how they were
implemented, and with what result” (pg. 12, emphasis added). The answers to
how these decisions have been implemented can be found in the in-depth
examination of Bokdrif itself—the focus of my field work concerning its structure
and operations, and the experience of the beneficiaries and the Project
Management Team (PMT). The results of these decisions—their successes and
failures—are what will be used to measure the viability of small-hold models
against the conventional models. Examining the case of Bokdrif through a
political ecology lens, the answers to why certain decisions were made can often
be ultimately connected to broader government policy imperatives that work their
way down to influence ‘ground level’ actions of those involved in Bokdrif’s
formation. This framework for case study investigations has been helpful in
structuring my project.

Field Work
The investigation of how beneficiaries’ decisions have been implemented
necessitated field work both on and off the farm. As part of my on-farm research,
my field work methods consisted primarily of semi-structured interviews,
informal conversations on the ‘oral histories’ of the project, and overt participant
observations. After learning of this unique small-hold hold project in the Western
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Cape, I contacted two of the farmers at Bokdrif, Georg* and his wife Helen*, and
an agricultural extension agent in the municipality, Paul*, who had worked very
closely with the project. I chose to make Georg and Helen my principal
informants for two main reasons, the first being that Georg served as the president
of the Bokdrif Trust, making him the primary point of contact between the
government and the farmers. This position had also made him the most
accustomed to working with ‘outsiders’ like myself. The second reason was
simply that of the farmers, Georg and Helen spoke the best English, and
communication was much slower and less clear when I approached the other
farmers.
This reliance on Georg for most of my primary research represents a bias
in my data. Georg is in a position of power, and I was not able to uncover any of
the other farmers’ opinions on his leadership, or their feedback on the reliability
of the information he was giving me. I was also unable to contact the beneficiaries
who were not residing at Bokdrif, which again, represents a broader bias in my
impressions of Bokdrif as a project. With the time and resource constraints faced,
however, I would make the decision to rely on Georg as a primary informant
again. As the president of the trust, he was, out of necessity, the best-acquainted
with the logistics of their operation specifically, and of land redistribution
generally. This makes his observations most conversant with the broader
objectives of my paper—to contribute to an improved land reform policy. Further

*

Names of the project, beneficiaries, and some interviewees (where indicated*) have been
changed.
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investigations of this nature, however, would benefit from the inclusion of the
other farmers’ perspectives.
After outlining my research objectives to Georg, Helen, and Paul, I asked
permission to make pre-arranged observational visits to the farm, conduct
interviews, and make Bokdrif the focus of my case study. As outlined in my
proposal to Macalester College’s Social Science Institutional Review Board
(SSIRB), I made very clear that participation was voluntary, and have made
efforts to protect the anonymity of those who did not wish to have their names
associated with this research. After receiving their consent under these conditions,
I made periodic visits (a total of eight) to Bokdrif and the nearby agricultural
extension office during the period of January to June 2007, and again during the
month of January 2008.
The on-farm interviewing processes varied depending on the topic of
conversation. When I was interested in finding information to address my first
two research questions, which investigate the economic and environmental
sustainability of the farm (discussed further below), I conducted semi-structured
interviews. These allowed me to glean factual, descriptive information about
cultivation schemes, farm management, soil, or irrigation, for example, while
permitting enough flexibility for the farmers to provide any additional related
information on these topics. During other visits, when I was addressing my third
research question investigating the level of participant satisfaction or exploring
the project’s history, I conducted unstructured or informal interviews to allow the

13

farmers to lead the conversation through their experiences with, and opinions on,
the project.
In addition to on-farm interviews, much of my time spent at Bokdrif
would be classified as what Kearns (2005) calls ‘uncontrolled participant
observation’. The ‘uncontrolled’ aspect of my observations refers to the openness
to all types of information. I was not searching for one type of data in particular,
but instead observing all that I could and later deciding which parts of my
observations were relevant to my objectives and research questions. My work was
‘participant observation’ because as I observed, I was almost always taking part in
the daily activities of the farm along with the farmers. These included afternoons
picking beans in the field, helping prepare and participating in family meals, and
taking breaks in the shade during the hottest parts of the days over home-made
ginger beer. These observations and the informal conversations they inspired
provided the “complementary and contextualizing evidence” that contributed
most to my understanding of Bokdrif and the beneficiaries’ lives and struggles
there (Yin 1983, pg. 13).
It is important to note that the presence of an ‘outsider’ often changes the
behavior of the ‘insiders’ being observed, yet as Kearns highlights, the continued
“conscious participation in the social processes being observed increases the
potential for more ‘natural’ interactions and responses to occur” (Kearns, 2005,
pg. 196). It was my hope that the farmer’s confidence in and acceptance of me
would increase with each additional visit, which was why I visited the farm on
multiple occasions. Though there is no tangible way for me to measure whether
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this was an effective strategy, the later interviews proved much more useful than
did the initial ones, giving credence to Kearns’ assertion.
In order to put this primary information about Bokdrif and the
beneficiaries in broader political and economic contexts, I conducted field work
outside of Bokdrif as well. This research consisted almost completely of semistructured interviews with members of Bokdrif’s project management team
(PMT), a planning and guiding committee that is required for all land reform
projects. As many of the members of the PMT were entities rather than
individuals (for example, the Provincial Department of Agriculture), it was often
difficult to determine which representatives from which organizations should be
interviewed. Generally, I aspired to speak with anyone who had been involved
with Bokdrif and had made contributions to or had information about the project.
Selection for my off-farm interviews was generally opportunistic, as I followed
the leads given to me by my interviewees who had experience and contacts in the
field.
Another aspect of this off-farm portion of my field work was examining as
many relevant documents from the interviewees as possible. Members of the PMT
were especially helpful in providing various documents that were very useful in
analyzing the economic and environmental aspects of Bokdrif. These included
budgets, business management plans, official government documents, grant
proposals, soil test results, water consumption data, and maps. One major setback
in analyzing these documents was that the vast majority of them were in
Afrikaans. As my time for the project was limited, I was often forced to choose
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which parts of documents would be most useful to my study and have only small
portions of them translated by interviewees or friends. Though this process
restricted the usefulness of these documents, they were still invaluable to my
analysis.

Data Analysis
After completing fieldwork, I organized the results of the decisions made
by those involved with Bokdrif into three categories that correspond to my three
research questions: economic sustainability, environmental sustainability, and
participant satisfaction. These divisions have been made primarily for analytical
purposes, but the categories are not isolated from each other. On the contrary,
successes in any one of the categories directly affect the other aspects of the
project. Even while I have separated them for the sake of organization, it will
remain important to reiterate the interconnectedness of these aspects and their
contribution to the overall success of Bokdrif.
Assessment of the farm’s economic sustainability is divided into four
categories. The first is the financial viability of the cultivation scheme, which
includes examination of market availability, proximity, and stability. Next, I look
at incomes, which are coming from many sources for the farmers at Bokdrif,
while expenditures are the focus of the following category. Finally, I examine the
livelihood security of the farmers, which constitutes a reflection on the
combination of all preceding categories. Within each category, I make
comparisons between these aspects of Bokdrif and those of conventional South
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African farms. Like the broader category under which these are organized, these
sub-categories are not exclusionary, but do help put the field work in a more
understandable format.
Environmental sustainability is the next platform of my analysis of
Bokdrif, and is also divided into four categories: soil health, water consumption,
energy consumption, and chemical use practices. This is not an exhaustive list of
potential factors that contribute to agriculture’s environmental degradation, but
highlights what I consider to be the major issues facing farmers in the Western
Cape, which will be highlighted further in following sections. Again, within each
category, I compare Bokdrif’s practices with those of more conventional farms.
Finally, participant satisfaction is the focus of the third category. This
category is clearly less ‘objective’ than the others, yet it seems clear that the
sentiments harboured by farmers towards both their farm and their fellow farmers
play a crucial role in the overall success of redistribution project. Many of the
project failures to date are a result of the frustrations of and conflicts between
farmers, managers, and shareholders, who no doubt find it difficult to fully
dedicate themselves to a project in which they find little satisfaction. Though this
is a central aspect of the project, it has been the most difficult category to
represent accurately. My method for analyzing is simply to include as much of the
opinions of the farmers as I possibly can, while offering a few of my own
interpretations of their expressions.
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A political ecology approach
My research is analyzed on the theoretical basis of political ecology,
which provides many useful lenses for examining the complex, interacting
processes that form the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to successful land
reform in South Africa. Political ecology has been described as the political
economy of human-environment interactions, a “confluence between ecologically
rooted social science and the principles of political economy” (Peet and Watts
1996). It sets itself apart from western paradigms of environmental discourses by
tending to focus geographically on the global south (although this trend is
changing—see, for example, McCarthy and Hague, 2004; St. Martin, 2001;
Walker, 2003) and conceptually on livelihoods, especially those of marginal
populations. A political ecology framework utilizes explanatory ‘chains of
causation’ in attempt to find root causes for livelihood issues and environmental
problems, examining how policies and economic conditions at multiple scales
work their way down to the ground to influence the land and the people who work
the most closely with it (see Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Peet and Watts, 1996;
Robbins, 2004).
Political ecology’s focus on marginalization is appropriate for examining
the processes at work at Bokdrif and in South African agriculture in general—
socially marginalized “historically disadvantaged individuals” have been set apart
by the color of their skin and forced onto environmentally marginal lands,
compromising the viability of their livelihoods and furthering their economic
marginalization. Even within these seemingly homogeneous populations,
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additional marginalization occurs on the basis of gender, age, or social status.
Marginalized farmers seek help from the post-apartheid state, whose
responsibility to protect its most vulnerable populations and resources is perverted
by aspirations of developing a globally competitive market economy. This “dual
role of the state” is a phenomena highlighted by Bryant and Bailey (1997, pg. 62).
These authors offer additional insight on the intra-state conflict seen in many
“functionally defined states”—those whose bureaucracies and departments are
organized on the basis of resource management and development, making
national environmental conservation goals difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
Bryant and Bailey’s (1997) theory on the role of the state will be helpful in
analyzing the South African government’s contradictory policies for land reform,
as seen from the point of view of the actors involved in my case study.
Robbins’ (2004) degradation and marginalization thesis is also applicable
to the land reform program, and provides a framework for examining cases where
“otherwise environmentally innocuous local production systems undergo
transition to overexploitation of natural resources on which they depend as a
response to state development intervention and increasing integration in regional
and global markets” (pg. 131). While local production systems in South Africa
cannot, in many cases, be classified as environmentally innocuous, any ambition
to operate “innocuously” is thwarted by the state’s unwavering emphasis on largescale commercial agriculture. This thesis will be an additional analytical tool for
understanding broader trends that affect the decisions made by all involved with
Bokdrif.
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My positionality
As with all social science research involving human subjects, especially
those of marginal groups, it has been important to be conscious of my role as the
researcher. My ‘position’ in relation to those I was interviewing was not easily
ignored—I was a young, white, educated, English-speaking, American female
‘academic’ interacting with a generally impoverished, rural, Afrikaans-speaking,
non-white, less educated community. My status as an outsider was thus
immediately visible, even if the farmers’ comfort with my presence increased
over time.
It is also worth noting that being a white American carried different
connotations than would being a white South African. In my observation, nonwhites in South Africa in general are less trusting of white South Africans (than
other white populations) because they associate white South Africans more
closely with their negative experiences during apartheid. Additionally, as
apartheid ended so recently, many white South Africans seem to have the same
internalized notions of race and difference that were originally fostered by the
apartheid government. As a white American, I was distanced from that
relationship in a sense, and I think, seen as more of a confidant by the farmers.
Despite the evident differences, there was still room for common ground.
One aspect that I believe to have been a crucial influence on the information the
farmers shared with me—and how it was framed—is my own background in
farming. I was born and raised on my family’s small farm in Wisconsin, and the
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ease of conversation with the farmers increased markedly after I shared personal
stories and pictures of home with them. The farmers were often as curious about
my farm as I was about theirs, and it provided a very useful conversation starter
and point of comparison. They had interacted with a fair number of academics
and seemed to have their own idea of the type of information they thought
academics were looking for. It seemed clear to me that they presented information
about their farm to me differently once my status changed from ‘academic’ to
‘academic/fellow farmer’, if only in a less guarded, more candid manner. The
effect of my status as both insider and outsider will be addressed further in later
sections.
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Chapter III
History of Land Issues in South Africa
To provide some background and context for discussion on the academic
literature, it will be helpful to briefly overview some events and policies in South
African history that are relevant to current land reform issues. South Africa has an
extraordinarily complex history, and it would be impossible to do it justice in this
short space, but I have tried here to choose the key points.
The Natives Land Act of 1913 illegalized ownership of land by nonwhites in all but a few small areas of South Africa, dispossessing ‘natives’ to
crowded, environmentally marginal ‘Homelands’, or ‘Bantustans’. Under this
legislation, 87% of the land area in South Africa was reserved for whites only,
who comprised only around 15% of the population at the time. The other 13% of
the nation’s land represented the fragments that were undesirable to the white
population for their poor soils, geographic isolation, and general dearth of natural
resources and infrastructure (Mather, 2003). The ten Homelands were divided on
the basis of ethnicity, and separate areas were demarcated for people of Xhosa,
Zulu, Ndebele, Basotho, Sesotho, Swazi, Tswana, Bapedi, Venda, and Tsonga
origins. Though these areas were not geographically contiguous, non-whites were
not allowed free passage through the white areas that separated them, furthering
their isolation [see Figure 1]. Over time, the exhausted soils of the Bantustans
became increasingly unable to support any form of agricultural livelihoods
(Thompson, 2001).
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Figure 1
The Former South African Homelands (Bantustans)

Source: Martins, Antonio. 2006/ Flags of the World website. Accessed 14 April 2008 at
http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/za(old.html 1

Over the span of the apartheid regime, much of the population in the
Homelands was all but forced to undergo a transformation from rural peasants to
urban proletarians to suit the labour needs of the National Party’s economic
growth strategies for South Africa (Ross, 1999). Many families derived the largest
share of their income from remittances earned by male heads-of-households who
1

Maps and boundary data are copyrighted by <A HREF="www.fotw.net/flags/g_ix.html">FOTW
- Flags Of The World web site</a>. For more copyright information, please see
http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/g-copy.html
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moved away to seek employment in urban areas or mining complexes, as South
Africa’s wealth of mineral resources in particular created a demand for cheap,
spatially-concentrated labour. The migrant labourers were often concentrated in
single-sex dormitories provided by mining companies, and were only allowed to
return home to their families for a very small portion of the year. Eventually,
significant sex-worker populations grew around these areas. Many scholars cite
apartheid’s engrained pattern of migrant labour as one of the main reasons South
Africa provided such ideal conditions for the spread of HIV/AIDS, and resultantly
has one of the world’s highest incidences of HIV/AIDS (Thompson, 2001).
In the Homelands was a huge class of poor rural children, elderly, and
women, who were left to support their families and cultivate alone what little land
they had. For those who persevered, there was little hope for anything more than a
bare subsistence-level existence (Ross, 1999). Millions of non-whites were thus
forcibly displaced, both physically and ideologically, from their homes, their
communities, and, despite the fact that the Homelands were rural areas, from their
livelihoods as farmers.
Outside of the Bantustans, virtually the only non-whites involved in
agriculture constituted a destitute farm worker population—employed by white
commercial farming operations—whose rights were scarcely better than those of
slave labourers (Hall, Kleinbooi and Mvambo, 2001; Scully, 1992). The farm
worker population has been studied extensively in the Western Cape in particular
because it is one of the provinces with the best-established commercial farming
sectors, which require large amounts of cheap labor. In the Western Cape, the
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majority of farm workers have historically been Afrikaans-speaking coloreds2,
most commonly employed by vineyards or orchards. There were few laws
protecting the rights of these farm workers, and they were thus subject to
evictions from their on-farm dwellings, poor education systems, harsh labor
conditions, low wages, and payment in the form of alcohol. This practice of wineas-wages, referred to as the ‘tot’ or ‘dop’ system, created a legacy of alcoholism
in the colored farm worker population which still exists today (Scully, 1992). As a
result, the colored population in the Western Cape has a chronically high rate of
children born with fetal alcohol syndrome and other alcohol-related birth
defects—the highest in South Africa. Many children who grow up with the related
learning disabilities are written off by under-resourced rural education systems
and do not attain the same levels of education as their white counterparts, further
embedding the social and economic marginalization of the colored farm-worker
population (GARC, 2006).
The continuous displacement of non-whites during the apartheid years had
vacated prime agricultural land across the country for white commercial farmers.
During this period, many agricultural products could only (legally) be marketed
domestically because of international embargoes against the apartheid regime. As
the National Party held the simultaneous goals of instituting a cheap food policy
and supporting white farmers, the regime provided generous subsidies to shield
many fledging white commercial farms from the competition of cheap imports
2

In South Africa, ‘colored’ is a term used to describe those with ‘mixed race’ origins, and, unlike
the American use of the term, is not considered derogatory. The colored population was
considered by the apartheid government to be a step above the black African population, a
classification now seen as a technique to divide non-whites to prevent a unified anti-apartheid
movement (Thompson, 2001).
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(Mather and Greenberg, 2003). In addition, white farms benefited immensely
from the cheap labour provided by the oppressed, disempowered farm workers, as
discussed above (Scully, 1992).
This subsidized white commercial agriculture was concentrated in the
Western Cape, a province whose varied terrain and climatic systems allowed the
establishment of a diverse production regime. Deciduous fruit (including apples,
pears, peaches, citrus, cherries and grapes), vegetables, wine grapes and wheat
were all successfully cultivated there. Dairying and livestock production (beef,
sheep, poultry, swine and ostrich) also contributed significantly to agricultural
output (Statistics South Africa, 2004). As the apartheid era drew to a close, a
lucrative, heavily-subsidized, white-dominated agricultural sector was well
established.

The post-apartheid era
By the early 1990s, whites comprised only 13% of the population, yet still
held ownership of the same 87% of land allotted for them with the 1913 Land Act
(DLA 1997). As previously mentioned, land redistribution was therefore both
politically necessary and crucial to promoting greater economic equality across
racial lines, especially considering that the vast majority of South Africa’s poor
live in rural areas (Davis, Horn, and Govender-Van Wyk, 2004). The
government’s goals to alleviate poverty and improve social services were
embodied in the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), which was
introduced shortly after the first democratic elections in 1994. Though it differed
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from other national development initiatives like structural adjustment programs
(SAPs) in its official focus on social service delivery, it identified macroeconomic
growth as the catalyst for social service improvements, and thus contained many
neo-liberal economic policies that closely resembled those of SAPs. These
commonalities included trade liberalization, reduction in government spending
and debt, and lowered taxes. With its two faces, the RDP attempted to represent
the development ideologies of both the new, more socialist ANC government, and
influential international development institutions like the World Bank (Carmody,
2002).
The land reform aspect of the RDP was the government’s official Land
Reform Programme put out by the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) in 1995,
followed by the White Paper on Land Reform in 1997. In these documents, the
DLA outlined three facets to the national land reform initiative. The first was a
land tenure reform program targeted at addressing issues of land use and
ownership rights, both in the former Bantustans and for labourers on white
commercial farms. Next, its land restitution aspect restored land or cash payment
to any displaced after the 1913 Lands Act, providing they had some proof of
ownership of a specific plot prior to displacement. Finally, the land redistribution
program provided grants for the purchase of land and agricultural implements to
‘historically disadvantaged’ households who applied (DLA 1997). The stated goal
of this national policy was to “provide the disadvantaged and the poor with access
to land for residential and productive purposes in order to improve their income
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and quality of life,” which it would achieve in transferring “30% of agricultural
land to black South Africans within 5 years [of 1994]” (DLA, 1997, pgs. 9, 38).
The functional arm of the redistribution facet was the Settlement Land
Acquisition Grant (SLAG) program, which provided a maximum of R16,000
(roughly US $2,286) per ‘historically disadvantaged’ household that applied, with
the exact award amount being determined by the household’s demonstrated need.
As even this maximum potential grant amount fell far short of the funds needed to
purchase adequate land for cultivation, much less an entire farm and the required
infrastructure and implements, beneficiaries were often forced to pool their grants
with as many as 100 other grant recipients to buy a farm. SLAG was largely
ineffective, managing to transfer only 480,000 of the 25.5 million hectares needed
to reach the goal of 30% redistribution by 1999 (Davis, Horn, and Govender-Van
Wyk, 2004).
Despite the fact that this ambitious goal was never reached, it inspired
fears in the country’s bastions of white commercial farming that South Africa
would follow in Zimbabwe’s disastrous footsteps—employing violent force to
ensure redistributive ‘success’. Because of these fears, many asserted that the use
of any government mandated removals, however diplomatic and dissimilar from
those of Zimbabwe’s Zanu PF government, would lead to the collapse of the
entire agricultural production system. Additionally, many white farmers had little
faith in the ability of black farmers to effectively run a commercial farming
operation (a sentiment which unfortunately persists today) (Goebel, 2005).
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In 1996, the ANC government introduced the Growth Employment and
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the official plan for South Africa’s economic
restructuring. This neo-liberal, ‘Washington consensus’ model strategy called for
market liberalization and deregulation to revitalize stale, inefficient domestic
production. In the agricultural sector, this translated into a phase-out of almost all
agricultural subsidies, underscoring that the new South Africa would have less
sympathy for the “economic deadweight” the white commercial farming industry
had become (Carmody, 2002; Mather and Greenberg, 2003). While some sectors
of production benefited from the newly acquired access to international markets,
such as the wine industry, others quickly felt the sting of international competition
impinging on formerly protected domestic markets (the wheat industry was
particularly susceptible to international competition) (Moseley, 2007).
In 1999, the second democratic elections saw Thabo Mbeki as the new
president of South Africa. There was a re-organization of power, and Mbeki
replaced many Mandela-appointed ministers, including the Minister of
Agriculture and Land Affairs, with more ‘business-friendly’ candidates. Shortly
after this shift, the SLAG program was succeeded by the Land Reform for
Agricultural Development program (LRAD), which increased the potential grant
size with a sliding scale model. Applicants could receive anywhere between
R20,000 and R100,000 (between US $2,857 and $14,286), depending on the
applicant’s own contribution of either cash or ‘sweat equity’. LRAD also allowed
any adult individual to apply for a grant, which made possible multiple grants per
household. This more neoliberal program was aimed specifically at creating a
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class of black commercial farmers modeled after the white commercial farming
sector (Mather, 2002; Moseley, 2007). Unfortunately, neither SLAG nor LRAD
has helped South Africa come close to achieving 30% redistribution by 1999, as
only 4% of the nation’s land had been distributed by 2006 (Cousins, 2006).

30

Chapter IV
Literature Review
Now that I have laid the base of descriptive information about South
African land reform, I will move onto broader analytical discussions concerning
land reform in this literature review. The research conducted for this project is
related to a number of different threads of debate surrounding agrarian reform
around the world. One of the most prominent of these debates has centered on
whether reforms should be market-led or state-led. Proponents of market-led
agrarian reform (MLAR) cite that the state does not have the capacity to
effectively or efficiently redistribute land. Because state appropriation of land
often provides sellers with a price that is less than market value, they argue, any
state intervention leads current land owners to “subvert the policy, evade coverage
by subdividing their farms or retain the best parts of the land” (Borras, 2003, pg.
368).
In addition, state-led reform is often supply-led, and pro-market reformists
thus tout it as inherently inefficient. This, they say, is because most often the state
is only able to redistribute environmentally marginal land, because “productive
farms are expropriated and subdivided into smaller, less productive farm units,”
and because “peasant households ‘unfit’ to become beneficiaries... are given lands
to farm” (Borras, 2003, pg. 368). The threat of state expropriation creates an
uncertainty that discourages much-needed investment from a variety of sources
while encouraging corruption in government officials and the land titling system
in general (Banerjee, 1999). Furthermore, state-led programs create a need for a
“behemoth”-sized bureaucracy that places huge strain on national budgets, even

31

more than the strain of the state having to fund the purchase of the redistributed
land itself (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997).
In contrast to state-led redistribution systems, MLAR proponents argue,
MLAR provides a far more effective strategy for redistributing land, and in
addition, encourages land-use systems that are far more economically efficient. In
the ideal MLAR program, argue Buainain et al. (1996), “only individuals with
human capital, previous savings, and adequate knowledge of how to make use of
the opportunities would make the decision to participate in the Programme ...
[MLAR will select] local people, who have closer relations with landowners,
better access to networks of social relations and information on local markets of
land” (pp. 29-30).
Proponents of state-led reform (such as Zimmerman, 2000; Mather, 2002;
Hall, 2004; Moseley, 2007) would argue that it is at exactly these points that
MLAR fails. Because the goal of many national land redistribution programs is to
redistribute wealth, those who are meant to benefit from redistribution would not
have access to savings or start-up capital. As the potential beneficiaries of land
redistribution are most often part of a historically marginalized population, it is
also very unlikely that they would have access to the ‘human capital’ and the
‘networks of social relations and information on local markets of land’ of which
Buainain et al. (1996) speak.
Addressing these issues in the South African context, Zimmerman (2000)
highlights the many problems inherent in SLAG. He argues that the program’s
target population—the poor—have less a chance than anyone at succeeding in a
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land redistribution project. He reasons that the poor are much less likely to be able
to afford the high up-front costs of land redistribution and initial contributions
necessary to receive a reasonably-sized grant. They also have less mobility to
move the long distances to the new redistribution sites where public infrastructure
is often poorer than that in the urban fringes, if it exists at all. They often have
less time to put into the project if they do move because they need to dedicate
more of their time to acquiring additional income. Almost invariably, grant
applicants lack adequate training in agricultural techniques or business
management, are more vulnerable to risks involved in agriculture, and have very
limited access to credit, educational programs and training, or agricultural
extension services. Even in the rare cases that a poor, non-white household has
access to the information needed to apply for grants, is able to write a coherent
grant and business plan, and move to the new redistribution site, it is highly
unlikely that the household has any familiarity with methods for successfully
managing a farm.
Far from addressing these problems, Mather (2002) argues that the newer
LRAD program was even more inappropriately focused on commercial
agriculture and creating a class of black commercial farmers, representing a
complete misunderstanding of the problems it was attempting to address in
replacing SLAG. Again, this had the effect of excluding the very population the
redistribution programs have targeted: poor non-white South Africans.
In a similar vein, Ruth Hall (2004) speaks to the political ecology theme of
dualism in her analysis of the shortcomings of South Africa’s national land
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redistribution policies. She locates the ineffectiveness of LRAD in its failure to
target the ‘agrarian dualism’ that is the source of the plight of the rural poor in
South Africa. The dualism exists between the modern, capital-intensive white
farming economy and the traditional, labor-intensive black farming economy in
the homelands. During the apartheid years, ‘racial capitalism’ created this
dualism, exploiting the rural black economy to effectively subsidize the white
economy with cheap labor. Since the end of apartheid, Hall argues, national land
reform policies have failed to effect any real change in the country side because
“the advent of non-racial democracy has seen a new configuration of class
interests and the emergence of a powerful alliance that is committed to
deracialising ownership but retaining the structure of the commercial farming
sector rather than restructuring the agrarian regime” (pg. 213). Instead of
restructuring the dualistic system, then, policies have focused only on attempting
to bring more non-whites over to the ‘modern’ side of the existing system. She
illustrates further the contradiction between ‘big policy and the shrinking state’,
pointing out that while the land redistribution targets are incredibly ambitious, the
state itself is increasingly unable to meet its own policy goals as development
spending is restricted by neoliberal, SAP-like economic policies. Here, it is
broader macroeconomic trends that “favor limited state involvement in the
economy” that present a major obstacle to social restructuring.
Moseley (2007) further highlights that LRAD’s focus on large-scale
commercial agriculture has been detrimental to the success of the projects,
especially for the vulnerable farm worker population in the Western Cape. He
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discusses eight specific barriers to successful land redistribution in that province
in particular. Neoliberal economic reforms, he argues, make the unprotected
agricultural sector vulnerable, and the associated willing seller / willing buyer
model leads to grant recipients receiving economically marginal farms. The small
grant size (even with the sliding scale model of LRAD) necessitates an
unmanageable number of farm operators, many of whom have unrealistic
expectations for financial gains; these hopes have often been inspired by the white
farms made successful by apartheid era protectionism. He argues further that
grant recipients’ agricultural skills are often mismatched for the farms they buy or
are too specialized in one area (eg., vine pruning) to be useful in whole-farm
management. Aside from inappropriate farming skills, many grant recipients have
no business management skills at all. Even with all this potential for failure,
protection and legal oversight is woefully insufficient in cases where problems do
arise. Finally, an insurmountable number of bureaucratic layers in the
redistribution project impede the grant recipients’ access to funds. He suggests
that allowing LRAD beneficiaries to practice small-hold or subsistence
agricultural practices would improve the success rates of some of the projects and
contribute to agrarian justice in the countryside.
The small-hold option that Moseley suggests is another controversial
subject in South African land redistribution. The economic and environmental
efficiency of small-hold model farms versus large-scale commercial farms is a
contested debate among policy makers and scholars in the field (for example,
Low, Akwenye, and Kamwi, 1999; Sender and Johnston, 2004; Lahiff and
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Cousins, 2005; Skarstein, 2005). Moor and Nieuwoudt (1998) use examples of
land tenure in Zimbabwe to inform South African land redistribution policy. They
find, from their research, that secure tenure rights at the level of the individual
family have a significant positive effect on both investment and agricultural
productivity levels. They also state that often, small-scale farms owned by
individual families are more environmentally innocuous than both large-scale
commercial farms and farms that are communally owned by large groups. They
compare situations in Zimbabwe to those in South Africa, arguing that secure
tenure rights are crucial to land redistribution and that redistribution projects
should not be communally owned by too many people—what they call the
‘indigenous’ model—because they are unproductive and environmentally
degrading. While this conception of what communally-owned ‘indigenous’
models entail seems misinformed, their research is valuable to South African land
reform because it provides some explanatory power as to why so many land
redistribution projects that are owned by too many people fail.
The combination of this literature suggests that market-led reforms are
failing to address the poverty alleviation goals of land redistribution.
Redistribution projects that hundreds of people attempt to co-manage stand very
little chance of succeeding, and large-scale commercial agriculture has not been
an appropriate focus in many cases. Clearly, an alternative model for land
redistribution is necessary—and this is where the analysis of Bokdrif’s history
and current successes and failures is relevant.
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Chapter V
Project History
In this section, I describe the personal history of two of the farmers
involved in Bokdrif, Georg and Helen, and their experience with the land
redistribution process. This is helpful in showing the ways in which these
beneficiaries are typical of and different from the ‘average’ land redistribution
grant recipients in the Western Cape Province (see Figure 2). The comparisons
drawn here will be helpful in interpreting the results of their efforts, and analyzing
their successes and failures in the broader national context of land redistribution.
Figure 2
Swartland Municipality

Source: Swartland Municipality http://www.swartland.org.za/
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Figure 3
South Africa

Source: Times Atlas, 1998

Like many ‘Cape Coloureds’, Georg grew up as part of a family of farm
workers on a vineyard in the Western Cape. His family worked and lived on the
vineyard, and were given small plots of land to grow their own vegetables. From a
young age, he was taught how to cultivate many different vegetables and grew to
enjoy gardening work. In primary school he completed levels up to standard four
(roughly equivalent to fourth grade in American education systems) while living
at home on the vineyard, but there was little education infrastructure for children
of farm workers to take advantage of in the rural areas. For many farm workers’
children, continuing education past this point necessitated moving off the farm
and into a nearby town. This was a difficult and often prohibitively expensive
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arrangement for many families, and as previously mentioned, has unfortunately
meant that the farm worker population maintained a generally low level of
educational achievement. Georg was unique in that he was able to secure lodging
and employment working for a doctor in Malmesbury (see Figure 3). He stayed at
the doctor’s home and worked at his office during the day while attending night
classes to finish standard eight.
From then on, he worked odd jobs in the Cape area and eventually married
Helen, another native of the Malmesbury area. Together they had three children
whom they raised in Malmesbury. While the children were young, Helen worked
in Malmesbury as a seamstress, and Georg commuted to work at an auto repair
center in Cape Town everyday by train, which was a 60km one-way journey.
During this period, Georg struggled with the alcoholism that troubled so many
other coloured families, bringing his marriage to the brink of divorce. When he
came home one day and found his wife and children gone, he decided to become a
farmer again, despite the significantly lower income levels, thinking it would have
a rehabilitative effect on him. After reconciling with his family, they moved to the
Atlantis area and joined the Atlantis Small Farmers Association (ASFA), which
had been recommended to Georg by a friend from his childhood on the vineyard.
ASFA is a non-profit organization dedicated to providing many types of
relevant job training to aspiring small farmers in the region, the majority of who
are coloured former farm workers like Georg and Helen. ASFA offers classes in a
variety of topics, including financial bookkeeping, farm management, animal
husbandry, and crop-specific cultivation techniques. In addition to training, the
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organization provides families with accommodation and plots of land which they
are allowed to lease on a yearly basis and are used to put their training into
practice. After Georg and Helen spent a few years there, they and few of their
ASFA neighbors became interested in establishing a more permanent foothold on
the plots they farmed there. Many of the farmers approached ASFA management
seeking extended leases and more secure tenure rights, but were repeatedly
denied. ASFA’s structure was not set up to provide the kind of tenure
arrangement Georg was interested in, so he and Helen began to investigate their
options for owning their own land.
In 2001, they approached Paul*, an agricultural extension agent at the
Swartland Municipal Department of Agriculture Office in Malmesbury and asked
for help and advice. Paul pointed out that they were eligible for LRAD grants.
However, he had had experience with over a dozen LRAD projects in the past,
and recommended Georg and Helen proceed cautiously in light of the fact that
every LRAD project in the district thus far had failed. He attributed this
phenomenon to the conflicts inspired by the large number of applicants who
attempted to co-manage the projects. In his experience, he witnessed differences
in managerial style mount into tensions that affected personal relationships
between the beneficiaries, often leading to irreconcilable conflicts. Once
professional relationships had been complicated by personal issues, Paul
recounted, it became even more difficult for members of the project management
teams (PMTs) to help mediate and provide technical support. Based on his

*

Names of the project, beneficiaries, and some interviewees (where indicated*) have been
changed.
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experience with these large-scale projects, he conjectured that LRAD farms
would fare better if they were divided up into units that were small enough to be
managed by individual families. Though Paul holds that it was his idea originally,
Georg also claimed ownership of the single-family plot plan. Georg says his
acquaintances who were members to other LRAD projects in the area had warned
him about the difficulties in attempting to manage a communally-owned project.
Regardless of where the idea originally came from, both Paul and Georg
realized the importance of finding other dedicated people to be part of the project,
so Georg decided to approach the other farmers who had been similarly trained at
the ASFA. From their acquaintances there, Georg recruited seven other families
who were willing to apply with them, for a total of 35 eligible grant applicants in
all.
After finding other beneficiaries, the next step was to put together the
project management team (PMT) necessary to all LRAD projects. Their PMT
consisted of the Provincial Department of Land Affairs, the Provincial
Department of Agriculture, the Swartland (Malmesbury) Municipality, the nonprofit organization Goedgedacht Agricultural Resource Centre (GARC, a branch
of the larger Goedgedacht Trust), and another non-profit organization called the
West Coast Ubuntu Farmer’s Association (WEKUFU, also a branch of
Goedgedacht), along with all the grant applicants.
The next step of the LRAD application process assigned to the farmers
was to search the real-estate market in the area for a suitable piece of land for the
farm. Every potential farm site had to be brought before all members of the PMT,
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examined in terms of the soil conditions, water supplies, infrastructure available,
terrain, and a host of other factors to measure the plot’s suitability for cultivation
and habitation. The group met about every month to go over possible sites for the
farm, and after a few months of searching, they found a site that looked
promising. It was a 31 hectare section of a larger white-owned farm called
Bokdrif. When divided, the parcel would leave slightly less than four hectares per
family. This was a sufficient size for the small-scale scheme the group had in
mind, and represented a plot size suitable for their training at ASFA. The site was
tested in a myriad of ways—in terms of soil drainage, soil erosion potential, soil
consistency and minerals, minerals in the ground water, depth to groundwater and
many others. It was also important that the site have characteristics at least
slightly similar to those at ASFA so that the farmers could render their training
applicable on their own new farms. It is important to note that, as is the case with
many other LRAD parcels, the land available for sale to the beneficiaries in
Georg’s group was the least productive corner of a white-owned farm. The white
farmer who owned the larger Bokdrif was selling it in part because of its reduced
productivity in comparison with the rest of his land. Still, this land was the best
available to the Bokdrif beneficiaries.
Once all the tests were completed to determine that the site was sufficient,
the PMT began examining ways to put infrastructure on the property. At the time,
there was no electricity infrastructure, running water, housing, nor any
agricultural buildings. Paul cites the first “big battle” of the redistribution process
as the difficult negotiations with Eskom, the largest energy company in South
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Africa, which functions similar to a para-statal. The farmers attempted to
persuade the company to install the kind of transformer they felt was necessary
for the success of their operation. In the end, Eskom refused their requests,
building them only a 50 Rva system despite their call for a 100 Rva system.
Georg believes this was ultimately because of a lack of funding.
Another unexpected “big battle” they encountered was something as
seemingly trivial as the entrance to the farm. Bokdrif is located adjacent to a
national highway, the N7, necessitating permission from the Provincial
Department of Road Affairs to build a driveway entrance. This proved a very
difficult task, and the project participants tired of waiting for responses from the
bureaucratic layers of the Department of Road Affairs, who denied all the
propositions put forth by the PMT. Despite the PMT’s proposal of many creative
solutions, such as stemming off of existing driveways or cutting across others’
properties, for example, the permission for driveway construction on the N7 never
came. Because there was no other access to the plot, this battle with the
Department of Road Affairs delayed the progress of infrastructure construction on
the plot, and set the whole project back by a few months. Finally, Paul and the
PMT decided to “bypass” the Department of Road Affairs and simply build an
access road themselves. They laid down a gravel road directly adjacent to an
existing driveway, predicting that the Department of Road Affairs would have
neither the time nor the resources to pursue legal action against them. Luckily,
their predictions were correct, and they were able to continue work on the farm.
Speaking in more general terms, Paul has said that many other governmental
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departments “turn a blind-eye” to situations such as these, recognizing that they
are too under-staffed and under-funded to be bothered with enforcing rules about
driveways, for example. He claims that had he not taken the initiative to help the
participants build their driveway, they would still be waiting today for a practical
way to access their farm from the highway.
As another part of creating their management plans, the farmers
brainstormed with the other organizations on the PMT to decide on their business
goals. The Department of Land Affairs requires a five-year business plan of
aspiring LRAD beneficiaries before approval of their grant applications, and it is
at this juncture in the LRAD journey that the government has held the power to
sway projects towards implementing a conventional farm business model. Unlike
the structure of many LRAD business proposals before theirs, the participants
decided to model theirs based on a gradual process of increased productive
potential. According to their business trajectory, they would start out in the first
few years as mainly subsistence level farmers and slowly increase their
productive capacity to become individual, family-run small commercial
operations. They would focus on vegetable farming, which suited much of the
training they had received in Atlantis. As an additional measure to maintain food
security, the farmers would also keep livestock on a family-by-family basis,
including pigs, goats, cows, and chickens.
After these careful preparations, the grant applications were submitted to
the Department of Land Affairs and were initially rejected because of the familyunit model that was being proposed. The Department criticized the low-input, low
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productivity model and pushed instead for a farm structure that would afford
higher productivity levels. According to Paul, it took a great deal of convincing
and appealing to peers in government on his part for the project to gain approval
and proceed as planned. As for funding for the project, each of the 35 grant
applicants was eligible for around R20,000 (about US $2,857), bringing their total
LRAD grant money up to a little over R700,000 (about US $100,000). After
receiving the Department of Land Affair’s approval for their LRAD project, the
participants were then also eligible for credit loans from the government-run Land
Bank, which lends significant amounts of money to most fledgling LRAD
projects, often hundreds of thousands of rand. In Paul’s observations, however,
the reason so many LRAD projects in the district were failing was not only
because of the complicated co-management scheme with dozens of competing
interests, but because of the large debt owed to the Land Bank by most
redistribution farms. In interviews, he rattled off names of failed LRAD projects
in the area, citing their inability to make a steady income for all the families
involved while attempting to pay off their debts of hundreds of thousands of rand
back to the Land Bank. Paul therefore insisted that the Bokdrif project acquire no
debt whatsoever, and that the farmers refuse to rely on loan funding to get their
project off the ground.
This meant a transfer of jurisdiction over the project—from the Land Bank
to the Provincial Department of Land Affairs—after the group agreed to bypass
any dealings with the Land Bank. Again, this plan did not align well with the
Department of Land Affair’s vision for the project, and it was a lengthy and

45

difficult process to convince both the Department and the Land Bank that this
unorthodox business plan was worthy of their approval. Their reluctance to
approve this business plan did not lie specifically in the beneficiaries’ refusal of
loan funding, but in the implications that a smaller budget had for the structure
and productivity levels of their future LRAD project. The negotiations with these
two government agencies were long and frustrating enough to warrant political
action on the part of the Bokdrif farmers. The group protested in front of
Parliament in Cape Town on numerous occasions, performing South African ToiToi protest dances and demanding that the Land Bank and Department of Land
Affairs commit to expediting the redistribution process. In retrospect, Bokdrif’s
efforts to disassociate from the Land Bank were well worth it. Having been
accused of unnecessarily slow bureaucratic processing and mismanagement of
funds for many years, the Land Bank was finally subjected to a governmental
audit in late 2007. The audit revealed that Land Bank officials had embezzled
over R2-billion that had been allotted for LRAD projects like Georg and Helen’s,
using the money to “fund their close friends' and associates' ventures,” including
“luxury golf estates, a sugar mill, equestrian estates and residential developments”
(Mail & Guardian Online, 6 December 2007).
In spite of the Land Bank scandals, the group’s efforts paid off in
September 2003, when the Department of Land Affairs and the Land Bank finally
approved the no-debt, low-input business model and the land for their new farm
was finally transferred to the name of the Bokdrif Trust nearly two years after
they had started the application process. Unfortunately, this two year time lag
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from the application to the transfer of the farm represents one of the fastest LRAD
project transfers committed so far in the Swartland municipality. Despite the fact
that the farmers now held the title to the land, the property transfer alone was not
enough for the group to be able to move on to the land to start cultivation. The
provincial budget for the rest of the year of 2003 had already been spent, so the
farmers were forced to wait until the new provincial budget approval was made in
the next year to receive their balance of grants, which was about R350,000 (about
US $50,000) left over after the purchase of the 31 hectares. Without this money,
the group could not complete any of the necessary infrastructure development on
the property, such as building houses, finishing the bore-hole pump and irrigation
system, and electrifying their parcels, so they remained at ASFA for another year.
When the balance of grants was finally paid to the Bokdrif Trust, the
group finished electrifying the plot, but the irrigation system took nine months to
even become operational, and was not yet completed as of January 2008. The
Housing Authority was also very slow in providing funding and materials
promised for building the farmers’ houses on the property. As a result, Georg and
Helen did not move onto the property until the latter part of 2004, and his was
even the first family to move there. They received some housing materials with
Paul’s help when they did not come quickly enough from the Housing Authority,
and have also resorted to dwelling inside government provided ‘storage sheds’,
which are meant for storing harvested vegetables. The Swartland Municipality has
also thus far failed to come through on its promise to provide plumbing
infrastructure, so the families still share outhouses. The Municipality has tried to
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shirk responsibility for the plumbing infrastructure by arguing that the Housing
Authority should be financially responsible for it, as the plumbing systems they
need should be inside of the houses. Alternatively, a spokesperson from the
Department of Environmental Health and Safety told me that she was trying to get
the Bokdrif farmers some grant money from governmental funds that provide for
housing improvements for farm workers. She believes that since the government
provides money for farm workers, they should also provide for the Bokdrif
farmers because they are former farm workers struggling on their own farm now.
She remains unsure as to where the plumbing money will come from in the end,
citing a “severe lack of communication” and “inter-sectoral collaboration”
between the different departments when it comes to land reform projects.
As of January 2008, only five of the eight beneficiary households have relocated to Bokdrif (Plots 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8—see Table 1)3. Of the other three
households, two live elsewhere and are charging rent to non-beneficiaries to live
on and cultivate their plots. One of these plots (Plot 3—see Table 1) is titled to an
elderly woman, Mrs. Alexander, whose grandson Daniel pays her rent to live and
farm there while she lives and works in Malmesbury as a dentist’s assistant. The
other (Plot 7—see Table 1) is titled to a man named Appelgrein who has since
moved to the Northern Cape to work on another farm that his family owns, and he
charges his friend Seim from Malmesbury to live on and cultivate his plot. The

3

Table 1 was compiled by me and is based on my own observations with help from Paul and
Georg. Paul laid out the format of the different plots and the names of beneficiaries, while Georg
helped me understand who was actually living at Bokdrif and the circumstances of each plot’s use.
Georg also told me about the other income sources for the beneficiaries and helped me estimate
what percentage of their income was earned in farming. The estimated percentages of plots in use,
cultivars, and livestock categories are based on my observations and information from Georg.
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remaining plot (Plot 6—see Table 1) is titled to the Frans family, who lives in
Malmesbury. Though they had aspirations of cultivating some more expensive
herbs and keeping a few pigs and sheep, they have not made any steps to actualize
these plans, and their unoccupied plot is used as goat pasture for one of the
resident beneficiaries who owns Plot 5, Adrian de Water, Senior.

49

Table I: Land Use at Bokdrif
Beneficiary
Household*

Seppie

Jansen

Alexander

#

1

2

3

Resident?

Yes

Plot Manager*

Seppie

Yes

Jansen

No

Daniel,
grandson of
beneficiary

% of
Plot
in Use

Plot Use

90%

Vegetable
cultivation, limited
livestock forage

75%

Vegetable
cultivation, limited
livestock forage

75%

Vegetable
cultivation, limited
livestock forage

Farming
as
% of
Income

Other
Income

20%

Manages his
own electrical
repairs
business

Cabbages, onions,
green beans, yarrows,
pepperdews, sweet
melon

pigs,
chickens

20%

Owns
multiple minitaxis

Cabbages, onions,
green beans, yarrows,
pepperdews, sweet
melon

pigs,
chickens

0%

Works as
dentist
assistant in
Malmesbury

Cabbages, onions,
green beans, yarrows,
pepperdews, sweet
melon

pigs,
chickens

20%

Disability
pension, lets
house in
Malmesbury

Cabbages, Onions,
Olives, green beans,
yarrows, pepperdews,
sweet melon

pigs,
chickens

Cultivars

Livestock

Georg

4

Yes

Georg

80%

Vegetable
cultivation, limited
livestock forage

de Water,
Sr.

5

Yes

de Water, Sr.

100%

Livestock forage

25%

Railway
pension

none

goats,
chickens

Frans

6

No

de Water, Sr.

100%

Livestock forage

0%

Employed in
Malmesbury

none

none

Appelgrein

7

No

Seim, friend
from
Malmesbury

75%

Vegetable
cultivation, limited
livestock forage

0%**

Farm in the
Northern
Cape

Cabbages, onion,
limited vegetables for
consumption

chickens

de Water,
Jr.

8

Yes

de Water, Jr.

20%***

Limited vegetable
cultivation***

10%

Employed in
Malmesbury

Limited vegetables for
consumption

chickens

*Names have been changed to protect the anonymity of the beneficiaries
**Appelgrein lives in the Northern Cape, where he has another farm. I was not able to determine what percentage of his income is from that farm, but 0% of his income was derived from farming at Bokdrif.
Seim, an acquaintance whom Appelgrein allowed to cultivate the plot, does derive almost all of his income from the farm, and appears to be the least financially secure of any of the Bokdrif residents.
***The remainder of the de Water, Jr., plot, is occasionally used by de Water, Sr., as forage ground for his goats.
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De Water’s use of the Frans’ plot is a point of contention between the
families, as he is not charged rent by the Frans family. Because of this, a number
of the other beneficiaries believe they should all have equal access to the plot, but
de Water argues that pasturing his goats requires more land than does vegetable
cultivation. Though the other beneficiaries know this to be true, they argue in
return that the beneficiaries were never intended to use livestock as their main
income generator on such small plots, and that they should all instead cultivate
vegetables as originally intended in the business plan and for which their training
at ASFA had prepared them. The problems the rest of the group has had with de
Water have led them to label him as “headstrong,” “stubborn,” and “difficult,”
and even Paul reiterated these sentiments. I was, however, unable to hear de
Water’s opinions on the situation as he was not willing to speak with me. The
tension between he and the rest of the group was strong enough that the group
failed to re-elect him as the president of the Bokdrif Trust two years ago when
they last held elections, choosing Georg as a president instead.
Despite these problems, the fact remains that none of the rest of the
farmers are fully cultivating their own plots, and so de Water continues to forage
his goats on both his plot and the unoccupied plot, which are the only two that are
being fully utilized. Though they have struck this uneasy balance with de Water,
the situation may easily form more tensions in the near future as the productive
capacity of Bokdrif increases, as the five-year business plan intends. That none of
the other plots are being fully cultivated may stem from the fact that all the
beneficiaries have other jobs or income sources in addition to farming (see Table
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1). It remains unclear to me whether the beneficiaries ever intended farming to be
their only, or even primary, source of income. The only person associated with
Bokdrif who seems to derive his entire income from farming is Seim,
Appelgrein’s renter on Plot 7, and he appeared to me to be the least financially
secure of the entire group.
Between my lasts visits in 2007 and those in January 2008, there was a
clear difference in the Paul’s morale with regard to Bokdrif, and he has become
very critical of the fact that none of the beneficiaries’ are at full cultivation yet.
Despite the fact that Paul himself was one of the champions of the small-hold
scheme, it appears he may have had a very different conception of what it would
materialize as. The number one discrepancy between Paul’s vision for the project
and that of the beneficiaries seems to be that he had assumed the farmers would
be using the project as their primary source of income. Additionally, even though
Paul knew that one of the implications of employing a small-hold model was a
lower production volume, he had envisioned each of the beneficiaries fully
cultivating his or her entire plot. It also seems Paul thought they would have a
more coordinated cultivation plan so that they could pool their produce to tap into
markets that required higher-volume sales. Thus, Bokdrif was meant to have been
more of a cooperative arrangement with a unified cultivation scheme—more
closely resembling the typical large-scale commercial LRAD projects. It is
important to note here, then, that though Paul advocated for a small-hold project
model, he did not do so because he thought the large-scale commercial models
were inherently flawed. Instead, he made this decision primarily so that it would
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be possible to stay debt-free. It appears that he still hopes Bokdrif will reach full
productive capacity, with the farmers dedicating almost all of their incomeearning efforts towards their farm.
In addition to his wish for the farmers to spend more time working on
cultivation their plots, he expressed specific frustrations that each year the famers
added an increasing number of items to their ‘wish list’. This wish list is a list of
farm supplies for which Paul then applies to the government, through the
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Program (CASP), for grant money. Though
the beneficiaries receive many of the items they request, Paul says that most of
the materials are still either in their original packaging in the piles where they
were delivered, or are not being utilized as they were intended. For example, most
of the resident beneficiaries received large water storage tanks in 2005 for
watering both their livestock and their families, but so far only Seppie has
installed his. A large amount of fencing material that the group received in 2005
was never installed and is now nowhere to be found, leading Paul to believe that
one of the beneficiaries sold it and kept the money for personal use. The Frans
family received materials for pig housing, but as they have not yet moved to the
farm to begin working there, those materials are sitting unused on their plot.
Georg, who has pigs of his own, has requested to use the materials, but the Frans
family has repeatedly denied his requests. One of the items that Georg received
from the CASP funding in late 2007 was an expensive vegetable shrink-wrapper,
which he had deemed absolutely necessary to the profitability of his vegetable
sales on my last Bokdrif visit of that year. When we spoke again in January 2008,
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he had had the shrink wrapper for some months, but had discovered too late that
the supermarkets to which he sold most of his produce were uninterested in
paying for the value-added on shrink-wrapped (as opposed to “naked”)
vegetables. Aside from the shrink-wrapper being under-utilized, Paul adds, the
vegetable scale that Georg received along with the shrink wrapper is not properly
cared for; he recalls “cringing” at the beneficiaries’ carelessness with the delicate
instrument.
Because the members of Bokdrif formed a trust, the land cannot be bought
or sold yet, but when it is finally able to come up for sale, it must first be offered
for sale to those in the trust. As of June 2007, it appeared that the families who
were not yet cultivating the land themselves were willing neither to sell nor to
begin cultivation, but none of the other Bokdrif members would have had the
means to buy it if it was put on the market at that point. Upon my last visit in
January 2008, the tensions both between the resident and non-resident
beneficiaries and within the farm families at Bokdrif were at their highest yet,
mirroring Paul’s frustrations. Georg was researching possible loop-holes to the
trust laws that prevent him and the other beneficiaries from sub-dividing and
selling their land. He is now expressing wishes to use what money he would get
from the sale of Bokdrif to start his own, larger commercial operation apart from
the rules, regulations, and interpersonal tensions of any trust. Despite Bokdrif’s
choice to employ a individual family plot management scheme to avoid the
difficulties with co-management, the classification of the whole operation as a
trust complicates disagreements between the families.
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For now, Georg and Helen, along with their grown daughter Anna*, spend
almost all of their time at Bokdrif, cultivating a variety of vegetables (cabbages,
onions, green beans, yarrows, sweet potatoes, pepperdews, and watermelon) and
raising a few pigs and chickens. Georg has also recently been the recipient of one
hundred free olive trees as the part of the Goedgedacht Trust’s Olive Path Out of
Poverty Programme (or OP POP, which means ‘pop up’ or ‘pop out’ in
Afrikaans). The trust received funding from the Dutch Postal Card Lottery to start
the project, which has community service, public health, and environmental
protection goals, especially in light of the dire predictions for climatic changes in
the global south. The Goedgedacht Trust has undertaken research as to what
options farmers in the Swartland have to prepare their crop regimes for the
climate change predictions for the Cape (which mostly entail reduced rainfall in
an already thirsty area). Olive trees use much less water and are hardier than the
deciduous fruit trees that many farmers in the Western Cape region grow. They
also have comparatively high returns per hectare when compared to the fruit trees
and cultivated vegetables.
Georg’s olive trees are still young and are not bearing fruit yet, but he
does hope to increase his hectarage in olives to one full hectare (300 more olive
trees) with the help of Goedgedacht. Before this happens though, the full
irrigation infrastructure must be completed. Right now each Bokdrif farmer’s plot
has a drip irrigation system, but it does not cover the entire plot of land. The
farmers must therefore spend a large amount of time every day simply moving the
drip irrigation pipes around to water their vegetables. This is difficult for Georg
*

Names of the project, beneficiaries, and some interviewees (where indicated*) have been changed.
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because he has had back problems since his days working in the vineyard as a
child. His back is in bad enough condition that he is considered legally disabled,
and must go to Malmesbury every two weeks to have his back readjusted, in
addition to taking an expensive monthly prescription. It is also important to note
that much of Georg’s income is from a monthly disability pension, which
represents a larger portion of his income than does farming. He additionally rents
out a house he owns in Malmesbury, leaving farming (by my estimation) at
around 20% of his income.
Though Bokdrif’s support systems are, in many senses, praise-worthy in
comparison to those of other LRAD projects, it has become clear that many are
providing patronizing, and not collaborative, support. All who have spent time
and effort helping Bokdrif succeed have had good intentions, yet some have
fostered an unhealthy paternalism among the beneficiaries. Paul, for example, has
never let the farmers themselves in on the grant application process, choosing
instead to take on all the work himself in fear that they would not write an
adequate grant. Because of this, the farmers come to expect a certain amount of
‘free’ grant money every year, and as mentioned earlier, Paul has begun to see
them as ungrateful.
In addition to fostering a ‘gift mentality’, the ideology of those involved in
post-settlement support systems has the power to shape the way the farmers
themselves view their small-scale production scheme. This is where the
hegemony of neo-liberalism and modern commercialized agriculture exemplifies
Robbins’ (2004) Degradation and Marginalization thesis. Even though Bokdrif
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has managed to evade the government’s overt economic policies that discourage
small-scale agricultural production, their experience in working with government
agents and others in the agricultural business is slowly internalizing in them a
newer, more negative image of small-scale production schemes. Even Paul, for
example, who spent much of his efforts on securing the small-hold model for the
beneficiaries, does not necessarily view this as the best farming model. He
promoted the small-hold model in this case so that no-debt would be acquired,
and though he views Bokdrif as the most successful LRAD project in the entire
West Coast District (see Figure 2), it seems that he labels this small-hold model as
the best that this particular population (coloured former farm workers) can hope
for. This probably stems from his training in apartheid era institutions, which
seems to have left him with the mentality that large-scale, white commercial
farms are the peak of efficiency and progress, while all other models are inferior.
Thus, though Paul was a champion of the small-hold model for Georg and the rest
of the beneficiaries, he still judges them against large-scale commercial farms.
Now, the beneficiaries themselves do not let their own farm escape this scrutiny. I
think this is why Georg is so eager to subdivide, sell, and start a larger
commercial farm—even though just a year ago, he was a fierce supporter of their
group trust structure.
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Chapter VI
Results
This results section is my own analysis, based on my experience with the
farm and my field work, of how Bokdrif is faring as an LRAD project. I wish here
to make a clear distinction between Bokdrif as a business entity in general and
Bokdrif as it compares in the context of other LRAD projects. I aim here to
compare Bokdrif specifically with more typical, large-scale commercial LRAD
projects on the basis of economic viability, environmental sustainability, and
participant satisfaction. It is clear that in comparison to a broader sampling of
farms in the Western Cape, Bokdrif is probably not as economically viable, and
may or may not be more environmentally friendly or satisfying to its owners. My
research, however, is focused on contributing to studies of LRAD projects in
particular, and judged in that arena, Bokdrif is faring remarkably well; it is easy to
call Bokdrif a success in that context because the bar for success in LRAD
projects is so low. Thus, when I use language that describes the ‘successes’ of
Bokdrif, I wish to make clear that I am defining that success in relative terms. It
remains evident that there are many improvements to be made on the Bokdrif
model if it is to inform other potential projects.

i. Business Management
In this section, I will provide my analysis of the business management
strategies at Bokdrif, with particular attention to those of Georg. I do not
endeavour to provide a quantitative economic analysis of his situation, as that is
outside the scope of my training. I instead reflect more on the soundness of
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Georg’s business decisions, based on the information available. This analysis is
also more qualitative in nature, at least partially out of necessity. The type of hard
numbers I would have needed to provide a more quantitative analysis were, first
of all, beyond the realm of what I deemed appropriate to ask in an interview.
Second of all, it did not appear that the farmers at Bokdrif prioritized financial
bookkeeping (at least for the income that farming at Bokdrif brought them), if
they kept financial records at all. A sizable share of their business transactions
were also conducted in more informal markets. I have chosen four categories on
which to base my business management analysis: cultivation scheme, income,
costs, and livelihood and food security. Though separated for organization’s sake,
these categories remain interrelated and successes in any one of the categories
directly affect the others.

Cultivation Scheme
In terms of the cultivation plan for Bokdrif, there seems to be
inconsistency and confusion as to what to plant where, and when, and to whom
the crops should be sold. There does not appear to be future cultivation plans
outlined other than those that have been outlined in Georg’s mind. He claims that
he plants what he thinks he will be able to sell, and has admittedly been wrong
about his decisions on several occasions. The sense of uncertainty about the
optimum cultivation scheme is reflected in the physical layout on Georg’s four
hectares. For example, on one of my visits May of 2007, he was having great
difficulty finding a market for his crop of sweet potatoes. The sweet potatoes
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stretched across a large section of his plot, a portion having been harvested, while
the rest remained in the ground as Georg waited to see where he could sell them.
Interspersed with the sweet potatoes were yarrows, large stretches of wild
watermelon laying rotting on the vine, and new onions, while pepperdews and
sweet green beans were planted haphazardly between patches of what was already
growing. All of this was just in the section nearest the house, beyond which was a
larger fallow area that was overgrown with weeds. At the edge of the property
nearest the road was the new patch of olive trees, which were admittedly being
given little attention in that important early stage of their life. Even so, he was still
hoping to receive more olive trees from GARC at that time. I should note that
although it has been shown that inter-cropping, when conducted properly, is
beneficial for both soil and harvest yields, the type of cultivation pattern Georg
was practicing was not an attempt at this strategy. Judging by his accounts, rather,
his mixed crop cultivation scheme was the result of Georg’s unsuccessful efforts
to follow unpredictable markets.
During my visits in January 2008, the cultivation scheme seemed to be
faring only marginally better than the year before. He was planting primarily
cabbages and onions after securing a contract with a nearby Pick & Pay
supermarket (to be discussed in more depth below), along with smaller plots of
pepperdews, green beans, and yarrows, for which he had no pre-set market. There
was still a significant area of fallow land. In early 2007, the Department of
Agriculture announced plans to implement a new nation-wide SMS market
information system for farmers, in which they could sign up for alerts to price
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changes for certain crops and livestock. Despite Georg’s initial excitement about
this when I last spoke to him in 2007, it has not proven particularly helpful, as it
only tells him what nation-wide price levels are, and does nothing to alert him to
more specifically local demand which he has the capacity to supply.
As Paul has stated, it is clear that this small farm, at least in its current
state, has nowhere near the per hectare production levels of a larger commercial
farm, and it is clear that a larger commercial farm would have failed long ago if it
had the type of erratic cultivation scheme that is being used at Bokdrif. The smallscale of Bokdrif, in this way, has been a blessing, but in others, it has been a
curse. Local buyers, for example, are not as accustomed to buying in such small
quantities, and seem generally disinterested in forming any lasting business
relationships with a small farm that doesn’t have the capacity to supply produce at
the level the grocery chains are demanding. It seems, instead, that they see
Bokdrif and other small farms as potential ‘shelf fillers’ of last resort for
occasions when there is a gap in what their larger, more stable farm partners are
able to supply. There are informal markets that Georg and some of the other
farmers have participated in, but they have been neither more stable nor more
lucrative than trade with larger chains. For example, whole-salers who supply to
markets in the townships outside of Cape Town occasionally venture northward
towards Malmesbury, stopping at farms on the way to purchase bulk quantities of
vegetables. Georg has sold to these buyers on a handful of occasions when he
could not find another market. These whole-salers paid very low prices because
they asked for un-cleaned and un-cut vegetables, and because they had to pay to
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transport bulk shipments of vegetables all the way back to Cape Town. Both Paul,
and one of the other farmers, Seppie, have called selling to the Cape Town wholesalers “stupid,” saying that it is usually a decision made in desperation. There are
also opportunities to sell fresh vegetables on the side of the national highway, the
N2, that runs in front of Bokdrif. However, because there are other vegetable
farms on both sides of Bokdrif that also sell produce along the highway, it does
not seem at this point that road-side sales would provide a significant or
consistent market for Bokdrif.
Thus, there have been very few stable business relationships that can help
inform the Bokdrif farmers what they should cultivate. Moreover, the five-year
business plan laid out by the PMT was necessarily vague, and has not been useful
to Georg in making the more specific season-to-season choices that should be
based on more current market information. It is safe to say that Georg has access
to neither the market information nor, more importantly, the business contacts that
he needs to make financially sound cultivation decisions.

Income
His cultivation scheme is thus based simply on which crops Georg thinks
he will be able to sell, rather than on adherence to a more inflexible, predetermined plan. His main buyers include the Pick & Pay and Spar supermarket
chains in Malmesbury, who have mostly bought his produce based on customer
demand, leading to inconsistencies and unpredictable income for Georg. There is
also a nearby packing and processing plant called Patagonia that buys his produce
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occasionally. In addition to selling fresh produce, Patagonia makes and sells some
of its own products, such as sweet chilli sauce, which fetch a higher price than the
produce. Georg only discovered by accident that he could earn more money this
way by planting the vegetable ingredients Patagonia needed for their finished
sauces and other products—hence, his preference for pepperdews. Though he is
attempting to plant based on market factors, he has not managed to create any
stable source of income. It is clear, then, why Georg has not come to the point of
being able to save money yet, as he has intended to do. Even so, he has remained
somewhat optimistic after receiving the olive trees from the Goedgedacht Trust
and finally securing a contract with the Pick & Pay supermarket in Malmesbury.
Bokdrif’s Pick & Pay contract was signed in late 2006, and included three
of the original beneficiary families, Seppie’s, Jansen’s, and Georg’s, along with
Mrs. Alexander’s grandson and Seim, the two renters. The contract stipulated that
these five farm entities supply Pick & Pay with cabbages and onions over three
years. I did not get a clear answer as to whether there was a certain quota amount
of onions and cabbages the farmers were obligated to supply. Paul insists that
there was no set amount at all, and that Pick & Pay was just entering into the
contract as a publicity stunt. Bokdrif has been receiving a modest amount of
publicity because of its novelty in the redistribution process, including
appearances in local newspapers and magazines and an audience with the
National Minister of Land Affairs and Agriculture, Lulu Xingwana. I am
sceptical, however, that even in light of this publicity, Pick & Pay would not
require an annual minimum tonnage. Adding to my scepticism is the fact that the
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farmers had occasionally expressed feeling pressured by Pick & Pay to produce
more than they were.
Whether or not there was a produce quota, Pick & Pay was to give the
farmers the entirety of the contract money, a total of R800,000, as an advance at
the signing, on which there was no interest. However, at that point, a non-profit
member of the PMT, the West Coast Ubuntu Farmers’ Union (WEKUFUF),
stepped in to broker the contract and charge the farmers 8% interest on the Pick &
Pay advance over the three year period. Georg and Paul were both upset at this, as
it appeared that WEKUFU had gone behind the farmers’ backs in dealing with the
Pick & Pay. Pick & Pay then distributed the advance to WEKUFU instead of the
Bokdrif Trust, and Georg says that though the farm was supposed to have
received the entirety of the money up front, WEKUFU has been very slow in
distributing the full amount. At our last meeting, he recounted that he had even
had to pay for the cabbage and onion plants, on which the contract was based, out
of his own pocket because WEKUFU had not yet given him the money. He had
also bought his first pick-up truck after signing the contract, thinking he could
rely on the advance money to pay for it, but as of June 2007 had not yet been able
to pick it up yet as he was waiting for the funding. By January 2008, he had his
pick-up, but remains weary of WEKUFU and their integrity as an organization.
Bokdrif has still not received the full R800,000, and Georg attributed their
problems with WEKUFU to difficulties it experienced after the untimely death of
their director, a friend of Georg’s, who was killed in a car accident shortly before
the signing of the Pick & Pay contract.
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The last time we met during my 2007 field work, Georg believed that the
cultivation of the new olive trees represented great promise, despite the fact that
the trees would not bear fruit to give the farm a profit for some years (a period
which will lengthen if the trees are neglected as they have been, although they
will still bear fruit eventually). It would definitely be a more stable source of
income, as the Goedgedacht Trust who is helping the farm with project has
supportive infrastructure set up for small farmers in the area. The Goedgedacht
Trust is a farm that cultivates many hectares of olives itself, and invested in olive
processing and packaging equipment. Using this equipment, Goedgedacht is now
selling olive oil and other olive-based products under its own label and will
represent a sure buyer of any olives produced by the small farmers in the area. It
has funding to plant another five hectares of olives every year for free on the land
of small farmers in the Swartland region, which is part of its initiative to prepare
farmers for the effects of climate change on their crops.
The Trust also has a support program in place called the “3C’s”, or climate
change crops. This program is aimed at finding as many crops as possible that
small farmers can produce with as little water as possible. In addition,
Goedgedacht researches which types of crops can be grown well with the olive
trees in the interim period before they begin bearing marketable olives. They do
this to ensure that the farmers have some source of income before the olive trees
can provide any. Goedgedacht will retain control of the aforementioned olive
processing equipment and thus will inevitably make more money than the farmers
for the value added in processing, but the organization is committed to re-
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investment in small-hold farms. Hopefully, it will remain consistent in its
dedication to helping small farmers achieve sustainable livelihoods.
Despite the potential stability offered by a partner like Goedgedacht,
Georg, as mentioned earlier, was set on subdividing and selling Bokdrif as soon
as was legally possible. If this happens as soon as Georg would like, the olive
trees will not bear fruit in time for him to see whether they would have been a
viable, steadier income source or not. It seemed that he did not wish to include
olive trees in the plans he had for his own commercial farm in the future, and
Goedgedacht would not be willing to provide them to a larger commercial farmer
if his plans were realized anyway.
It appears that income from farming thus far at Bokdrif has been
inconsistent but sufficient, and that the farmers are at least attempting to move
slowly towards more reliable sources. If some of the other farmers continue on at
Bokdrif, even if Georg leaves, they would need to focus their efforts on securing
more stable buyers. For this, they would probably need help from the government,
possibly in the form of tax breaks for companies who buy LRAD produce. A tax
break seems an effective possibility in light of the fact that Pick & Pay was
apparently willing to advance Bokdrif R800,000 without any pre-set contract for
how much produce they would receive. Because of the scale of operation of
Bokdrif, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for its income flows to come
even close to that of larger commercial farm redistribution projects. The reason
Bokdrif is still running, whereas many other LRAD projects at this stage in their
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life were failing, appears to be a combination of their reduced costs, discussed in
the next section, and the farmers’ diverse income sources.
Though the discussion of income thus far has centered on Bokdrif’s
farming income, the key point to consider when looking at the farmers’ income is
that all but one of them have other significant income sources (see Table 1). The
only person at Bokdrif who does rely solely on agriculture for his income, the
renter Seim, appears to be the least well-off financially of all the residents. If the
farmers did not have these other varied income sources, it is difficult to say
whether they could still afford to continue farming at Bokdrif. At the same time,
however, perhaps if they did not have to dedicate another portion of their time to
earning money in other ways, more of their time and energy could have been
spent in attempts to reach full cultivation at Bokdrif and find new markets for
their produce.
Though Paul expresses wishes for the farmers to dedicate more, if not all
of their time to Bokdrif, it could be argued that this allowance for income
diversification is one of the strongest points of the small-hold family model.
Many other LRAD projects in the district were large and labor intensive enough
to require most of the resident farmers’ time and energy. Though normally only a
small portion of the beneficiaries are dependent on their farms for income (while
many of the rest retain outside jobs), the large-scale project represents a more
narrowly-focused livelihood strategy for those who do depend farm income. In an
already volatile, unpredictable industry, livelihood diversification may be one of
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the only realistic ways for LRAD beneficiaries to reduce risks and lessen the
income shocks typical in the agricultural economy.
Additionally, if and when larger LRAD farms failed, the farmers were left
with nothing because they had abandoned their former livelihoods to invest
themselves in their new projects. In many of these cases, the farmers were worse
off financially than before they received LRAD grants. If Bokdrif were to fail
completely, almost all the residents would be able to recover relatively quickly
from any financial losses they incurred. That said, in Bokdrif’s case many
government workers would argue, as Paul does, that the project had received far
too much grant money to exist as a supplementary form of income, rather than a
primary livelihood. The large amount of government money received, and the
apparent inefficiency in how the money has been spent, does not seem to justify
labelling Bokdrif as ‘supplemental’. Though Bokdrif is not an exemplary model
in fiscal responsibility, I believe other LRAD projects could benefit in an
allowance for other supplemental activities that would reduce the severity of the
income shocks that are inevitable in the agricultural market, especially for
newcomers like LRAD beneficiaries.

Costs
The costs incurred by the farmers running Bokdrif so far have been
particularly low in comparison to other LRAD projects, due at least in part due to
the large amount of grant money they have been able to secure. Aside from the
grant support systems Bokdrif has in place, one factor sets it apart from so many
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other LRAD projects and many farms around the world: it has no debt. This was
primarily because of Paul’s insistence that ‘no borrowing’ be a stipulation of the
business management plan, and it has been possible primarily through his and
Georg’s efforts at finding and taking advantage of government programs that will
provide funding for whatever costs they sustain. One program in particular, South
Africa’s Comprehensive Agricultural Support Program (CASP), has been
especially helpful. Bokdrif received in excess of R600,000 of free grant money
from this program from 2005-2007, which benefits many small farmers. Under
this program, the farmers meet with Paul and discuss specific equipment, building
materials, and implements they need for the year, determine the costs, and write
an application for funding that details the specific items—this is the ‘wish list’
discussed earlier. It is this money that has funded the irrigation system (so the
farmers will not have to move the drip irrigation pipes daily), the construction of
vegetable shade houses, shelters for the pigs, fencing, the un-used vegetable
packaging equipment discussed earlier, and various gardening tools, among
others. It remains to be seen how long the farmers will be able to take advantage
of this program, as the funding for it has been drastically cut in recent years. It is
funded on a provincial basis, and the Western Cape’s budget dropped from R75
million in 2005 to R33 million in 2007.
The cost of large implements is one factor that has been a problem for
Bokdrif, as they have not been able to afford all the equipment they need to
become the small commercial enterprise they are aspiring to be. They currently
need to borrow almost all large equipment (tractors, ploughs and disc ploughs,

69

rakes, etc) from the Goedgedacht Trust, and Georg remains uneasy about the
farms dependency on implements that belong to someone else. He hopes that with
moneys from the CASP application next year (this year’s money has largely
already been spent on the above mentioned items) and the Pick & Pay contract,
the farm will someday be able to afford their own equipment. This would reduce
their dependency both on Goedgedacht and on hiring temporary labourers. Three
to five temporary workers are needed to complete tasks over several days that
Georg could complete in one day by himself if he had the right equipment.
Right now, it is difficult for Georg to afford hired labourers to help with
farm tasks even for busy times, so it remains to be seen how long it will actually
take to save up the kind of money needed to buy expensive implements like
tractors. Still, the cost of family labour is ‘free’, and Georg, Helen, and their
daughter all work the farm. Other input costs are less concerning: the cost of
seeds is relatively inexpensive and easily covered by the farmers, and they do not
use enough chemicals for them to constitute a large operational cost (and these are
often paid for with CASP money). They also get fertilizer for very cheap, and
sometimes at no cost at all, from the neighbouring chicken farm. However, as
mentioned earlier, the Bokdrif Trust was only able to attain a less-productive
parcel of land from a larger white farm. Because their land is less productive, they
do need a significant amount of fertilizer to maintain healthy vegetables.
This is one instance where Bokdrif’s small scale is both good and bad for
cost minimization. Because Bokdrif is a small-scale farm, the nearby chicken
farm all but donates for what would be a significant cost to the farmers, whereas
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they charge one of the larger farms down the road much more for their manure.
Additionally, the Bokdrif farmers apply the manure ‘manually’, with shovels and
wheelbarrows, allowing them to be more discriminating about where they apply
the fertilizer. This reduces the amount of ‘per-crop’ manure they need to fertilize
relative to a larger, more mechanized operation with the same cultivation scheme.
Therefore, Bokdrif’s fertilizer costs are reduced both because of the smaller percrop volume they need and because of the chicken farm’s benevolence to its
smaller-scale neighbors. One could also argue, however, that the time costs of
manually applying the fertilizer make up for the reduced monetary costs of
fertilizer for the Bokdrif farmers. Based on the economics of family farms and the
advantage of family labor exploitation, I would say that Bokdrif still has a cost
advantage over larger-scale operations in terms of fertilizer costs. Their smaller
scale, then, allows them to keep costs of fertilizer down even on less productive
land. It is important to note, however, that if Bokdrif did begin to operate at a
larger scale, the fact that they have less fertile land to begin with would quickly
turn into a disadvantage.
Beyond the cost of fertilizer, one payment that has been difficult for the
farmers to pay has been the electricity bill to Eskom, which is R150 per month per
family. It seems to be more the rigidity of the amount and the day that it is due
that is the real problem, as the farmers’ incomes are highly variable and
dependent on seasons, weather, and markets that electricity bills do not heed. The
R150 monthly amount was written into the Trust’s laws at its inception, yet there
is still debate over why each group should have to pay this. Here again, there is
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tension between Adrian de Water, Senior, and the rest of group, as Mr. de Water
claims he uses less energy and that the payments they make should be
proportional and not a pre-set amount.
Where the Bokdrif farmers may have difficulty paying R150 a month in
electricity bills, beneficiaries of a large-scale commercial redistribution project
would have been faced with significantly higher costs. This is primarily because
of the debt they almost necessarily incur in their purchase of the implements and
inputs necessary to run a successful large farming operation. Even in cases where
commercial redistribution projects in the Malmesbury area experienced a larger
flow of income, Paul says, the proportion of income they dedicated to paying the
operational costs and interest on debt was clearly much higher than they could
afford to keep up with—or even to survive. The fact that Bokdrif is both surviving
and even slowly expanding suggests that the costs of this small-hold operation are
much more manageable.

Livelihood and food security
With all the support mechanisms in place, the fact that they have no debt,
their full ownership of the land, their steadier income from non-farming sources,
and their relatively low cost of living, Georg and Helen seem very secure in their
livelihood, increasingly so as they learn more about predicting and cultivating for
specific markets. As discussed earlier, other income sources make a larger
contribution to the beneficiaries’ income, but owning their own land can be seen
as an additional measure of securing the families’ economic futures. None of the
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families appear to be struggling with food security (as this could be a source of
embarrassment it would be understandable if the situation were otherwise and the
farmers did not want me to know about it, but I think this is unlikely). With the
high rate of failure experienced on the large scale commercial projects in the area,
it is difficult to see how those participants could have been more secure in their
livelihoods. At first glance, it may seem that Georg’s wish to sell his plot would
suggest a defeat for the project, and while this is true in some sense, this is a very
different ‘defeat’ than that experienced by most other LRAD projects. Many other
projects that fail are completely liquidated and leave the beneficiaries with little or
no assets. In Bokdrif’s case, Georg is looking to use what he’s saved from his
LRAD project and expand on it, working to develop his farming abilities rather
than get out of the business altogether. Whether this is a wise economic decision
or not, it does at least indicate that he has more financial security than most other
LRAD beneficiaries in South Africa.

ii. Environmental Management
In this section, I discuss the environmental impacts that Bokdrif has and
draw some comparisons between Bokdrif’s impact and that of more conventional
LRAD projects. Again, it was outside the scope of my project to conduct in-depth
quantitative studies; even if the kind of data I would need for a quantitative
analysis of Bokdrif’s chemical usage, soil health, and water and energy
consumption were readily available, there have been no published studies that I
am aware of addressing the environmental impacts of LRAD projects (see Rippon
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& Meadows, unpublished, 2006). Instead, as in the last section, I provide a more
qualitative analysis of decisions that have been made at Bokdrif with regard to
four categories: soil, chemical use, water, and energy consumption.

Soil
The soil at Bokdrif is very sandy, a soil type classified by the South
African Soil Classification System (SASCS) as Fernwood, which is comparable
to the Entisol soil type of USDA Soil Taxonomy system (INCO-DC, 1999).
Entisols are often described as soils with no horizontal profile development
evident, and when found in dry, hot, sandy areas, they can have a high infiltration
rate (meaning that water is unlikely to runoff the surface of the soil). These soils
are moderately well-suited for growing the vegetables that Georg and the others
have selected (the sweet potatoes, onion, yarrow, and cabbage are best-suited, but
all are growing fine there). Before the farmers bought that section of what was
once a larger farm, the previous owner mined the sand from that section, leaving a
relatively thin layer of topsoil that was not particularly fertile.
The sandiness of the soil makes it well-drained, the land is relatively flat,
and there are rarely excessive amounts of rainfall in the area—all of which mean
that the potential for erosion is very low. In addition, the fact that fewer plants
would grow on the soil if the farmers did not plant them means that the soil now
has more plant roots to hold it down. The soil’s sandiness, however, does make
leaching a problem, as nutrients tend to sink below levels where plants roots can
effectively use them. The chicken farm and broiler houses in the farm adjacent to
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Bokdrif are convenient, giving the farmers a cheap and easy way to replace these
leached nutrients. The chicken manure contains nitrogen, first and foremost, but
also has helpful trace elements such as copper, zinc, manganese, and boron.
Because it is applied by the individual farmer rather than a larger machine, it is
used more sparingly than would be done on a larger more mechanized farm,
meaning there is less potential to over-fertilize (which often contributes to
eutrophication in nearby streams, rivers, or lakes—but because there is so little
runoff this would be less of a problem at Bokdrif anyway). There is also
something to be said for the fact that they are not using more harmful synthetic
fertilizer, but are instead using a nearby source of nutrients (in the form of
chicken manure) that would be going to waste otherwise.

Water
Water is the biggest environmental risk factor for farmers in the Western
Cape, according to Paul. The region has a Mediterranean-like climate, with winter
rain fall (May-August) and very dry, hot summers (November-February). The
Western Cape’s annual precipitation is only 348 millimeters, and it has the most
variability between annual averages of any other South African Province
(ENPAT, 2001). There is little availability of underground artesian wells and
aquifers, and there are few bodies of water from which to draw for cultivation.
Bokdrif is lucky in that it is situated atop an artesian well that is as yet
uncontaminated. The farmers applied to the Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry to extract 63 cubic meters per hectare on 7 hectares of land (they applied
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for only seven hectares, because as previously mentioned, none of the plots are
near under full cultivation). Their application was approved, and they have
consistently been extracting the maximum amount. This is troubling, because as
Paul reports, 63 cubic meters is no less water than would be used per hectare on a
large commercial farm. It remains a mystery where the water is being consumed,
as Bokdrif is producing so much less per hectare than a large-scale commercial
farm.
Paul says that he doesn’t understand Bokdrif’s water consumption levels,
while Georg argues that the farmers need every bit of water they are extracting.
Georg has complained that the larger farm across the road, which shares the same
small aquifer, consistently withdraws more than its water permit allows. Perhaps
Bokdrif’s withdrawal levels are a knee-jerk reaction to their neighbors’
overconsumption, leading them to withdraw as much as they can in fear that they
will be missing out if they do not extract as much as they possibly can before their
neighbors use up their shared supply. Another possible explanation for their high
water use levels is that their already sandy soil had been mined by the former
owner, leaving them with high infiltration rates. This would mean that the water
they do give their crops drains more quickly to a level below which the plants
utilize.
At this point it is important to reiterate that market-led agrarian reform
(MLAR) proponents, as previously discussed, have argued that state-led reform
will lead beneficiaries to receive marginal land. In the case of Bokdrif, however,
the MLAR system was what led the beneficiaries to receive marginal land, as
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their plot is a less desirable—but more affordable—plot of land that a more
successful white farmer no longer wanted. This, in turn, may be affecting both the
financial viability of Bokdrif—in that they need to buy more inputs to make their
soil productive—and the environmental sustainability—in that their soils have
higher infiltration rates and they use more water than they would otherwise need
to. This represents a major environmental problem, then, because Bokdrif has
access to sufficient water supplies where many other farms do not, and is
producing less per hectare than other farms while using just as much water. As
water is one of the most precious resources in the Western Cape, this is a problem
that Bokdrif needs to address.

Chemical Use
The use of chemicals on the farm is very low compared to a larger
commercial farm, as Georg uses only two insecticides (no herbicides or
fungicides are necessary): cypermethrin and deltamethrin. He applies these by
hand with a rudimentary hand-held bag sprayer, which is one of the main reasons
he uses so much less than a large farm that would spray by machine. At least part
of the reason that only these two chemicals are used is that South African farmers
are finding their products unmarketable to European markets unless they comply
with “Europgap,” the regulations for chemical usage standards put out by the
European Union. Although Paul claims that these two insecticides are not harmful
to humans at all, do not cause cancer or any other adverse health effects, and do
not contaminate groundwater, my own investigations have proven otherwise. The
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EPA has labelled all pyrethrins (the chemical group that both cypermethrin and
deltamethrin fall under) as having at least moderate potentiality as carcinogens,
and also found that it is highly toxic to aquatic animals. It is also suspected that
this family of chemicals are endocrine disruptors, which often has consequences
for reproductive systems of both animals and humans (EPA, 1998). This makes
the fact that the farmers at Bokdrif are aspiring to become more commercialized
and employ mechanized spray systems problematic.

Energy Consumption
Energy consumption, both in terms of electricity consumed and fossil
fuels burned, is significantly lower at Bokdrif than it would be on a large scale
commercial farm. In the case of electricity, this is because there is really not any
infrastructure at Bokdrif that is even capable of consuming large amounts of
electricity, as evidenced by the fact that the farm only has a 50 Rva system. Their
biggest factor in electricity consumption is the electrified water pumping system;
household uses are negligible. They also clearly use less fossil fuels than would a
large farm because they do not have the equipment, and instead rely far more on
expending human energy (in terms of hiring farm workers instead of mechanizing
the same task) than on fossil fuel energy. Again, however, the farmers, if at all
possible and when they can afford to, will become more mechanized as soon as
they can. This will make their fossil fuel consumption patterns increasingly
similar to those on large-scale commercial ventures.
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iii. Participant Satisfaction
Though this part of my analysis is far from being objective or quantifiable,
it remains one of the most important to the success of the project. I have
attempted simply to relay what the farmers have expressed to me and give
reflections on my observations of the farm.
It seems clear that the farmers are materially less well-off than they were
while they lived together at the Atlantic Small Farmers Association. Georg and
Helen both spoke nostalgically of the comfortable accommodations and the
conveniences that were available to them while they lived there. The simple fact
that three of the families have not yet moved to Bokdrif and do not intend to is
evidence enough that the material conditions elsewhere are more favourable.
Bokdrif has yet to receive many of the materials promised by the Department of
Housing (hence, their resorting to dwell in vegetable storage containers) and has
not yet received funding or support services to put in plumbing systems on the
farm (the responsibility of the Swartland Municipality).
Though Helen was one of the main informants for my project, this case
study is clearly biased towards Georg’s point of view because he was the primary
decision-maker on matters dealing with Bokdrif. Helen’s account provided mostly
background information, and therefore even in the re-telling of the story of the
project to which she has dedicated all her efforts in the past few years, she seems
a peripheral figure. This in itself reveals much about the power dynamics of
Georg and Helen’s relationship. Perhaps it is this clear lack of decision-making
power that made Helen the more likely of the two to express dissatisfaction with
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the project and their new lives there. Although both Georg and Helen have
expressed concerns about the current state of Bokdrif, Helen seems to have found
the transition more fraught with difficulty than Georg has. For example, while
Georg has more access to better farming equipment for the work that he does
fulfilling his ‘role’ as husband and provider, Helen has less access to the
conveniences that made her ‘role’ as a wife and mother much easier at Atlantis.
She also seems more distressed that her two sons had no interest in living with
them on a farm, as they had grown up in town and wished to stay there. It also
seems clear to me that their daughter would move to town if she could, but has
nowhere to go and a child to support, and needs the help of her parents. It seems
safe to say that Helen does not have much decision making power in the
relationship, as evidenced by her constant reference to the fact that she loves her
husband and must follow where he goes when asked what she would like to do
instead. Despite these concerns of Helen’s, she has expressed in genuine terms
that she does love living away from the city and feels very proud of the fact that
she and Georg own their own farm now.
If Helen speaks in glowing terms of farm life, Georg nearly bursts with
excitement when the subject comes up. He attributes what success he has had with
the project to the fact that he has a born passion for farming—“You must be born
a farmer, you can’t make a farmer. It must be inside you,” he says. “But once it’s
inside you, you can’t take it out.” By all his accounts, he is pleased with what he’s
achieved so far, even if he realizes that there is still much work to be done. He is
deeply proud of his achievement in getting this farm of his own, and very happy
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to give advice to any other potential LRAD grant recipients who come around—
which is a lot, considering the relative fame this project has brought him. Because
this project is one of the first of its kind, it has become a bit of a ‘poster-child’ for
land redistribution in the Western Cape, scoring Georg appearances in
newspapers and magazines, and an audience with the new National Minister of
Agriculture, Lulu Xingwana. It is ironic that the government at the provincial
level, on one hand, made it so difficult for the beneficiaries to participate in a
small-hold project, yet the government at the national level is holding up Bokdrif
as a an innovative new method they are using to address problems with the LRAD
process. It seems that though the government is using Bokdrif as a ‘feel good’
story to promote their efforts to improve the LRAD system, they are not wholeheartedly behind the concept of small-hold redistribution projects.
Though it is clear that Georg is proud of his accomplishments at Bokdrif,
the fact remains that he aspires to sell it and move onto a bigger, more financially
lucrative commercial farm as soon as he can. His dissatisfaction in the project
appears to be located in the group dynamic, and in particular, with Mr. de Water.
The biggest problem Georg has with Bokdrif is that he does not have full power
to make his own business decisions, even with the individually-owned plot model.
I believe that his dissatisfaction is greater than the rest of the farmers’ in this
arena, possibly because he is the president of the trust and is responsible for
making decisions that affect the group, and is therefore the person most open to
criticism by the other farmers. Another element of what dissatisfaction he has
with project stems from his wishes that Bokdrif would be more lucrative. Here, it
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seems that Moseley’s (2007) assertion that many LRAD beneficiaries have
unrealistic expectations for profit levels stemming from their impressions of
agriculture during apartheid’s protectionist era is very applicable. To Moseley’s
point, I would add that in addition to expectations of more profitable ventures, the
LRAD beneficiaries have high expectations in terms of simply being able to break
into the network of their white counterparts, when in reality, this is much more
difficult than they predict it will be and than the South African government would
probably like to admit.
Despite what problems the farmers have with Bokdrif, and the tensions
between the members, they are faring far better than most other LRAD projects
would normally be at this point in their project’s history (see Table II for full
comparison between Bokdrif and other LRAD projects). Even in January 2008,
when, as mentioned earlier, tensions within the group were at their highest that I
witnessed, Paul still labelled Bokdrif as the most successful LRAD project the
district had ever seen, and all the resident participants except Georg were still
clearly tied to the work they had done, and expressed plans to stay at Bokdrif.
That, in itself, puts Bokdrif in a better place than other LRAD projects, even if it
does not represent the ‘perfect’ LRAD model.
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Table II: Categories for Analysis
Broad Category
Sub-Categories
Economic
Sustainabiltiy

a. Cultivation Scheme

How does Bokdrif compare?
Erratic cultivation scheme shows less knowledge of and
access to markets than a larger commercial LRAD
project
More diverse than those of residents at a typical LRAD

b. Income Sources

project; almost none of the residents makes more than
25% of his or her income from farming
Much lower than a typical LRAD project because of no-

c. Costs

debt model and additional CASP grant money, their
biggest fixed cost is a monthly energy bill
More secure than the typical LRAD project because they

Environmental
Sustainability

d. Livelihood Security

have risked less by not acquiring debt and are able to

a. Soil Health

dedicate time to other income-earning activities
Soils poorer than most commercial farms, but they apply
natural fertilizer manually, thus reducing the risks
associated with both synthetic fertilizers and runoff from
overfertilization
Uses just as much water per hectare as a large-scale

b. Water Consumption

farm while producing less, may stem from soil's high
infiltration rate or competition with farm across the road
Negligible in comparison to typical LRAD project, but

c. Energy Consumption

intentions to expand in future will require much greater

d. Chemical Use

energy use
Much lower than a typical LRAD project because their
small-scale allows more sparing manual application of
less toxic pesticides, although these still pose health risks
for people and animals
Bokdrif is faring much better than a typical LRAD project

My interpretation of Georg and
Participant
Satisfaction

in this category, even though there have been group
Helen's feelings about the project tensions and Georg wishes to subdivide and sell his plot
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Chapter VII
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Reviewing this case study and its particularities has been informative for
the broader body of literature on land reform in South Africa. First of all, this case
shows that contrary to market-led agrarian reform (MLAR) proponents’ argument
that state-led reform leads beneficiaries to receive marginal land, the opposite is
true: the MLAR system is what let these beneficiaries to receive marginal land.
South Africa’s MLAR system dictated that best possible plot available at an
affordable price to Bokdrif’s beneficiaries was a smaller, less-productive corner
of a white owned farm whose top-soil had been mined. This has important
implications for the future structure of land reform programs in South Africa. It
implies that beneficiaries could have access to better plots if the state took a more
authoritative position to securing productive land for LRAD projects. Already,
under the relatively new National Agricultural Minister Lulu Xingwana, the South
African state has begun expropriation of land for the land reform program within
the last year. Hopefully this will have a positive effect on the successes of LRAD
projects in the future.
On the other hand, giving the state more responsibility on paper may lead
to an even more difficult, bureaucratic land reform process overall, because Hall’s
(2004) problem of ‘big policy and the shrinking state’ is evident in this case
study. The beneficiaries’ experience illustrates the tremendous amount of
bureaucratic layers (‘big policy’) one must traverse to participate in the land
reform program in South Africa, even while there were instances where it was
clear that the different governmental departments involved were too under-funded
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and over-worked (‘shrinking state’) to enforce these contracts and laws. In
Bokdrif’s case, this is evident in their ‘battle’ with the Provincial Department of
Road Affairs to get approval for an access road. Additionally, there was a lack of
communication between the different governmental departments who ‘touched’
Bokdrif, and occasionally their different policies were contradictory. This is
exemplified in the confusion as to which governmental department was
responsible for funding for Bokdrif’s plumbing systems. Perhaps this lack of
communication and collaboration between the different branches of government
stems from what Bryant and Bailey (1997) label as the ‘functionally-defined
state’. Functionally-defined states, like South Africa, divide the government into
different resource management departments (eg, Department of Water Affairs and
Forestry, Department of Land Affairs, Department of Minerals and Energy). With
each branch of government focused specifically on managing their particular
resource, it is very difficult to create a unified strategy for LRAD projects, whose
success depend on careful management of multiple categories of resources that
refuse to fit neatly under the jurisdiction of one governmental department.
In addition to the policy contradictions between different governmental
branches, there is an inherent contradiction in the roles of the state itself—again,
Bryant and Bailey (1997) are helpful with their analysis of the ‘dual role of the
state’. They argue that the state’s responsibility to protect its most vulnerable
populations and resources is perverted by aspirations of developing a globally
competitive market economy. In Bokdrif’s case, this is clear in the paradox of the
government holding Bokdrif up as a poster-child LRAD project while
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simultaneously having discouraged their small-hold model to begin with. On the
one hand, the social development side of the state champions a more socially
contextualized small-hold, family farming model as better for the project
participants; on the other hand, the neo-liberal state discourages a less productive
small-hold project model as economically inefficient and bad for the economy. It
seems that, with Georg’s wishes to have a more productive, large-scale farm, even
he has internalized in him an increasingly negative view of the small-hold model
that seems to originate in the neo-liberal state’s unwavering emphasis on highinput, high-output farming models. Again, this internalization of the government’s
neo-liberal development strategies can be seen as an instance of Robbins’ (2004)
Degradation and Marginalization thesis—where state development intervention
compromises the environmental sustainability, and thus, the economic
sustainability, of local production systems. Though the small-hold model is shown
in this case to be more environmentally innocuous overall than typical LRAD
projects and represents a more economically secure livelihood, it does not fit into
the state’s neo-liberal economic development strategies that measure success
based on national-level macroeconomic indicators.
Finally, this case contributes to Hall’s (2004) arguments that the LRAD
program is failing because it fails to address agrarian dualism in the countryside.
She argues that the overall binary structure of agricultural systems in South
Africa—the modern, capital intensive side that is subsidized by cheap labor from
the more traditional production systems—is not being targeted by LRAD policies.
Instead, the LRAD program is simply attempting to create an elite class of black
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commercial farmers without restructuring this problematic dualism. The struggles
of the Bokdrif beneficiaries to have their small-hold model approved by the state
shows clearly that the state is focusing on creating large-scale, commercial LRAD
projects. Even though the state finally did approve the small-hold model scheme,
the Bokdrif farmers are being pushed by government discourse, by the structure
of the markets that they have not yet been able to break into, and even by Paul, to
boost productivity levels and to increasingly resemble a large-scale commercial
farm. Thus, even these small-hold model project beneficiaries, that have proven
their project to be more successful overall than the typical large-scale commercial
models, are being pressured to move away from their original structure and to
become part of this class of elite black commercial farmers.
In terms of refining policy recommendations from these conclusions, it
would be unreasonable to attempt to generalize or make broad value statements
concerning all small-hold and all large-scale commercial farms after having
examined only one small-hold model. There can be no clear-cut answer as to
whether the small-hold model is in all cases better or worse, because the success
of the project depends very much on all the different contexts in which it is
created. There have been large-scale commercial operations that succeed, and
there are aspects of even this well-supported, well-funded small-hold project that
are not faring well.
After discussing the project’s strong points and shortcomings, it seems
clear that there are five very important factors in the relative success of this
project when compared to other LRAD projects. The first is that it had no debt,
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which plays an enormous role in the financial viability of the farm. As the Land
Bank has recently become so embroiled in scandal and corruption, now seems as
opportune a time as any for the government to de-emphasize agricultural lending
for LRAD projects. Though it does not seem feasible to stipulate that LRAD
projects receive no loan money, I would recommend that other LRAD projects,
like Bokdrif, do as much as possible to research grants and other support systems
that provide ‘free’ money, rather than borrowing from credit institutions. This
may be increasingly difficult as government budgets are cut, as evidenced by the
CASP programs funding shortages of late. However, if LRAD applicants steer
clear of large-scale commercial models that require so much more start-up capital,
it is much more plausible that other groups could follow in Bokdrif’s ‘no-debt’
footsteps.
The second factor of Bokdrif’s relative success is the amount of support
systems it has in place, in terms of both finances and infrastructure, and simply
people who are invested in the success of the project. This justifies the findings of
numerous authors who cite the lack of post-settlement support as one of the
primary points at which many LRAD projects fail (such as Zimmerman, 2000;
Mather, 2002; Cousins, 2005; Moseley, 2007). Without the support of financial
mechanisms like CASP, organizations like the Goedgedacht Trust, and people
like Paul (who admits that the Bokdrif farm is the project that is the “closest to
[his] heart” of all he worked with so far), it would be infinitely more difficult for
Bokdrif to have succeeded to the point it has. Because of the publicity Bokdrif has
had, it is difficult to say if other projects would be able to secure as much support
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as they have, and it would be misleading to assert that their success in this arena is
something that all small-hold LRAD projects could attain if they become more
common.
Still, one aspect of Bokdrif that has worked greatly to their advantage was
collaboration with NGOs like Goedgedacht, rather than strict reliance on
government support systems. South African government departments, in most
cases, are under-resourced and have not exhibited the ability to provide the full
extent of services a fledgling LRAD project requires. Local NGOs provide
another potential support mechanism for such projects. Further research should be
conducted as to the possible roles NGOs could fill in relation to land reform in
South Africa, and into the logistics of NGOs potential relationships with
government agencies in assisting with LRAD projects. In light of the
government’s shortcomings in its land reform programs so far, should NGOs be
considered a part of the national land reform program? How can their work be
incorporated into or encouraged by national-level land reform policies? These are
just a handful of the many questions that could be researched, and I believe the
NGO community holds great potential for improving the LRAD project success
rates in South Africa.
The third important factor in Bokdrif’s operations is the individual
household management scheme. Although there have been arguments between the
households at Bokdrif, they have not had as much of a negative impact on
business decisions on the farm as they would have if there were a joint
management scheme. One recommendation I would have as to how to improve
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the group dynamic in future small-hold model LRAD projects would be to add a
required group constitution in addition to the business management plan. Many of
the problems between the households at Bokdrif could have been fairly resolved if
there had been a pre-set list of rules regarding use rights, group expenses, and
resource use. Though Bokdrif does have a constitution, it outlines little but the
process of electing a new board president. The group would have benefited
greatly from a more in-depth constitution, and it seems that other LRAD projects
would do the same. Here, for example, lies an opportunity for NGO involvement
in the LRAD process. An NGO in Cape Town, the Legal Resources Center
(LRC), has a land reform sub-branch that has helped more recently emerging
LRAD projects draft constitutions that are legally binding. I paid a visit to one
such project that was showing at least as much promise, if not more, than Bokdrif,
in large part thanks to the help they had received from the LRC and other local
NGOs. Beneficiaries there had a much clearer picture of their role within the
larger project, and at least from my superficial examination, their operations
appeared to be running with far fewer conflicts than Bokdrif.
The fourth important factor in Bokdrif’s relative success is the fact that the
small-hold scheme allows the farmers enough time and energy to continue to earn
income in other ways, which, in effect, subsidizes their farming operation.
Despite the fact that they are not at full cultivation capacity yet, the farmers are
financially stable and are slowly working towards full capacity. This would
suggest that LRAD projects could benefit if the government allowed for a more
gradual ‘transitional model’ business plan, rather than attempting to reach full
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productive capacity in as short a time period as possible. A transitional model
business plan would allow for beneficiaries to retain other means of income while
building up their farms, and should a beneficiary, such as Georg, wish to expand
capacity further, he or she would have the agricultural base and financial stability
to do so. Here again, however, as Robbins (2004) might argue, the hegemony of
national-level neo-liberal economic policies that push for maximum production
could easily prevent the realization of a more locally contextualized solution for
LRAD beneficiaries.
The final crucial factor is the determination and ambition of the farmers.
In this project in particular, the amount of hard work put in by Georg is
noteworthy. Paul admits that he would have nowhere near as much will to help
Bokdrif so much if he was not so inspired by all the work Georg put in himself. It
is clear, though, that Georg has had much more agricultural training than have
most other LRAD applicants, received during his days at ASFA. This draws
contentious questions in terms of trends in South African land reform thus far—is
the land reform program as it stands effective at recruiting ‘the right type of
applicants’? What are the merit and qualifications, both professional and personal,
of

potentially

successful

applicants?

Could

the

government

possibly

operationalize a ‘recruitment’ strategy to improve the success of land reform
projects, and what are the ethical implications of such a strategy? Currently, the
LRAD process seems to discriminate against the poor in its reward for up-front
financial contributions. In light of the fact that there must be some discrimination
in who does and does not receive LRAD money simply by virtue of the fact that
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there is not enough to go around, what factors could the government use, instead
of the applicants’ finances, to decide who is awarded grants? These are very
difficult questions to grapple with, and are deserving of careful research and
consideration.
As a model, small-hold farms hold great potential for the land
redistribution program in the Western Cape. Although there are not many in
existence from which to draw data, it appears after examining Bokdrif that there
are many aspects of this type of management model that would suit some grant
applicants better than a large-scale commercial endeavour. More research,
perhaps more quantitative research than my study can provide, will be valuable to
the discussion on the viability of the projects. What can be determined from my
research is that small-hold projects can be successful, that they represent
opportunities for livelihood security for rural populations, and that they can be a
great source of pride for those who work on them. It is very clear, however, that
the government and other support mechanisms play a crucial role in the success of
any redistribution project. Hopefully with more research, new alternative smallhold models for land reform can begin to help South Africa towards reaching its
land redistribution goals in the name of poverty alleviation and giving justice to
marginalized South Africans.
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